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Introduction 
 
Animal communication has a long history of study; partly because 
communication is ubiquitous in biology, but also because of the implications it can have 
in topics such as sociality or the origination and development of human language. Animal 
communication also involves many diverse and fascinating behaviors, including some of 
the most remarkable displays within the natural world.  For example, the superb bird of 
paradise has a vibrant blue patch of feathers, which it displays while dancing and clicking 
to court females. The whole of this dissertation could be filled describing and discussing 
similarly incredible signaling behavior. Animals also signal in many contexts (foraging 
for food, selecting a mate, deterring potential predators, etc.) and the individuals involved 
do not always agree on the best outcome in these contexts. For example, prey should 
decrease the reliability of pursuit-deterrent signals and thereby overstate their ability to 
escape from predators. This creates a paradox because here, and in other contexts with 
conflicting interests, signalers should decrease reliability, but then receivers should stop 
using signals and communication would no longer occur. Yet we observe that 
communication exists in its many fascinating forms, so what maintains this diversity of 
signaling behavior if signalers and receivers have conflicting interests? The answer to this 
question has many potential answers, such as signal costs (i.e., handicaps), constraints on 
signal production (i.e, index signals), etc. (see Hurd & Enquist, 2005; Maynard Smith & 
Harper, 1995; Searcy & Nowicki, 2005), but no clear consensus has emerged for the 
extent to which various mechanisms are important, and in what circumstances.  
In Chapter 1, I contribute a new perspective to these discussions by integrating a 
model of receiver choice and game theoretical approaches. From the model, an important 
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theme emerges: receiver tolerance of imperfect reliability (abbreviated as receiver 
tolerance). Receiver tolerance, or the tendency to follow partially reliable signals, is an 
important topic in animal signaling, complementary to the typically emphasized topic of 
signal reliability. Understanding why signals are reliable and why receivers follow 
imperfect reliability are equally important; I expect the combination of reliability and 
receiver tolerance to ultimately determine the form and stability of signaler-receiver 
interactions. To explore these themes experimentally, I developed a signaling game that 
allows control over theoretically important variables (such as the cost of signals). The 
game places blue jay subjects (Cyanocitta cristata) in a signal-response game played for 
food rewards, and under various experimental conditions. Chapters 2 and 3 present a 
series of these signaling-game experiments that demonstrate the effects of signal cost on 
signal reliability (or honesty) and show the extent to which receivers are sensitive to 
uncertainty in the environment. Chapter 2 demonstrates that receiver tolerance increases 
when environments are uncertain (to the point that receivers are gullible), and that 
signalers are sensitive to the level of receiver tolerance – exploiting tolerance when 
signaler and receiver interests conflict. In Chapter 3, I show that high signal cost does 
increase honesty under conditions of conflict, but also that cost is unnecessary in 
mutualistic conditions. This research is significant because signal reliability enforced by 
signal cost (i.e., handicap signals) is an important topic in signaling theory, but lacks 
direct empirical support. Chapter 4 further analyzes current disagreement and controversy 
in ‘costly-signaling’ literature. Taken together, these results establish the value of 
considering both signal reliability and receiver tolerance. 
   3 
Chapter 1: Flag-model receivers and the ‘problem of 
reliability’.  
 
Introduction 
A focus on signal reliability tends to dominate literature on animal 
communication, to the extent that answering the question ‘why are signals reliable?’ has 
been referred to as the most important pursuit in animal communication research 
(Maynard Smith & Harper, 2003). Discussions of signal reliability center around a 
paradox called the ‘problem of reliability’. The standard explanation of this phenomenon 
goes like this: signalers may benefit from signaling unreliably, but then receivers should 
simply stop using signals to make decisions, and this de-stabilizes communication 
because signaling is pointless if the receiver ignores signals. Importantly, however, this 
simplified ‘boy-who-cried-wolf’ story makes several simplifying assumptions regarding 
signaler-receiver interactions, which ultimately constrain our insight into this important 
topic. Here we integrate an economic model of receiver behavior into the more standard 
game theoretical approach to studying signal reliability to provide new perspectives on 
the problem of reliability. 
The typical ‘problem of reliability’ explanation assumes the reliability of signals 
is dichotomous, either signals are reliable (often meaning perfectly reliable) or unreliable. 
Instead, signals can exist anywhere in a continuous range, from those that always indicate 
the correct action for receivers to take to those uncorrelated with the correct action. 
Students of animal signaling are likely aware that reliability can be graded, and we have 
many examples of reliability estimates in natural signaling systems – often measured as a 
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correlation between states (say male quality or fighting ability) and signals (e.g., Fischer, 
Kitchen, Seyfarth, & Cheney, 2004; Hill, 1991; Møller, 1994; Tibbetts & Dale, 2004). 
This awareness of graded reliability is difficult to apply to signaling theory, however, 
because it is not always clear how reliable an imperfect signal must be to maintain 
receivers’ use of signals when making their decisions. This relates to a second 
problematic simplification: the strategies available to the receiver are not often fully 
described. The standard description holds that receivers use ‘reliable’ signals to make 
decisions (termed ‘signal following’) and not ‘unreliable’ ones, but what are the 
alternative strategies for receivers? Clearly we cannot fully describe the ‘problem of 
reliability’ if we focus too narrowly on signalers because the receiver’s alternative to 
signal following ultimately determines the consequences for both individuals if 
communication breaks down (Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 2000).  
Other simplifications aside, it is crucial to acknowledge that knowing the level of 
reliability is not sufficient to determine whether following signals benefits receivers (e.g., 
McLinn & Stephens, 2010). Instead, signal following behavior depends on an interaction 
between reliability and the base rate of the events important to the receiver (such as the 
relative abundance of high quality males to low quality males in problems of mate 
choice). Yet some foundational models addressing the problem of  signal reliability seem 
to conclude that the underlying distribution of states is unimportant in determining 
signaling solutions (e.g., Maynard Smith, 1991). This result runs contrary to intuition; 
information is more valuable when outcomes are uncertain and therefore receivers should 
follow signals with reduced reliability in these situations. Alternatively, if a particular 
state is highly likely, the receiver does not need signals to have a high likelihood of 
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making the correct choice. Thus the same level of partial reliability may promote receiver 
signal use in some conditions but inhibit signal use in others.  
Given that communication hinges on receivers heeding signals in some way, it is 
critical to understand how receivers deal with issues such as partial reliability and the 
base rate of events when making decisions. The flag-model of receiver behavior (McLinn 
& Stephens, 2006, 2010) focuses on the economics of receiver strategies to predict 
receivers’ responses to signals and cues and, importantly, it provides clear definitions of 
receiver strategies, incorporates the base rate of events and also allows for the partial 
reliability of cues. The flag-model predicts the value of following signals from the 
perspective of the receiver, and thus provides a solid framework for demonstrating the 
conditions where communication could benefit both individuals, despite conflicts of 
interest.  
The ‘problem of reliability’ implies signalers and receivers could benefit from 
communication, but incentives for the signaler to decrease reliability prevent this 
equilibrium from being realized. As such, our model first identifies the possible levels of 
signal reliability where the signaler benefits from signaling (as opposed to not signaling) 
and the receiver benefits from following the signals (compared to ignoring them). We 
then demonstrate whether these levels of reliability are stable against alternative 
reliability strategies, or if the reward for decreasing reliability is too high and the 
‘problem of reliability’ manifests itself instead.  Finally, we extend the basic signaling 
model to explore the effects of costly signals on the stability of signaling. This is a 
natural first step to adding complexity to our model because signal costs, or handicaps, 
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are offered as the solution to the ‘problem of reliability’, but substantial disagreement 
exists over the role of costs in enforcing honest signaling (Grose, 2011; Számadó, 2012). 
The flag-model of receiver behavior 
Flag-model predictions for receiver behavior 
  Here I briefly review the flag-model of receiver behavior as developed by 
McLinn and Stephens (2006, 2010). Consider an individual that must choose between 
multiple actions in a varying environment. The term ‘environment’ is used to describe 
any feature external to the receiver (e.g., food item quality or predator presence). The 
environment can exist in either of two environmental states. For convenience, and to 
retain generality, we label the two states as ‘E1’ and ‘E2’. E1 occurs with the probability 
p and the E2 state with probability (1-p).  The variable p describes the environmental 
certainty, where p=0.0 or p=1.0 indicate certain environments because in these extreme 
cases the state of the environment is always the same. The receiver chooses between two 
actions in this environment, where each action is best in only one of the two states of the 
environment. These actions could represent, for example, attacking a food item or 
ignoring it, or accepting or rejecting a potential mate. We label the receiver actions 
generically as A1 and A2. The receiver’s payoff is set such that it is rewarded for 
matching its action to the current state of the environment; the A1 action is rewarded in 
state E1 and the A2 action in state E2 (see Table 1). We imagine there is also a cue 
available to the receiver that indicates the current environmental state with a level of 
reliability described by the variable q, where q=1.0 is a perfectly reliable cue and q=0.5 
is a random cue with no correlation to the state of the environment. So the receiver must 
decide between two actions, but neither action is correct all of the time. What decision-
   7 
making strategy should the individual adopt under this uncertainty? Specifically, when 
does it pay to use the information provided by the cue? 
The flag-model compares two general receiver strategies: use the cue to guide 
actions (cue-following) or ignore the cue and simply choose the single action that is best 
on average. The general result of the flag-model is that receivers should evaluate both p 
and q when choosing whether to attend to the cued information. To show this, we need to 
compare receiver cue-following strategies and ignoring strategies, where the receiver 
chooses the single action that is best on average. A cue-following strategy yields a payoff 
of R  = ; the receiver is rewarded for each match of action to 
state, and by definition the signal matches the state a proportion q of the time. The payoff 
for an ignoring strategy depends on the base rate of the environmental states. Always 
choosing A2 yields R = , since the receiver is correct only when the state is E2 
(occurs 1-p of the time). Alternatively, always choosing A1 pays R = . Thus we expect 
receivers that ignore cues will always choose A1 when p>0.5, and A2 when p<0.5. 
Optimal receiver behavior is to follow cues when q > p  and q  > 1-p, but otherwise 
ignore the cues, Figure 1 shows this logic graphically.  
Signaling to flag-model receivers: the basic game 
Signal-response game 
Adding a signaler to the flag-model creates a simple form of communication, the 
signal-response game. The basic components of communication are an environmental 
state, a signaler who provides signals that correspond to the state, and a receiver whose 
actions determine the payoffs for both individuals (Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 2011). Here 
we have two states (E1 or E2), a signal with two signal states (M1 or M2), and receiver 
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actions (A1 or A2), and each individuals’ payoff is set by the combination of receiver 
action and state (see Table 2A for definitions and 2B for payoff combinations). For 
simplicity, we restrict our attention to when p ≥ 0.5. The commonness or relative 
frequency of each state of the environment is an important piece of signaler-receiver 
dynamics, as we will show, thus we will sometimes refer to E1 as the ‘common state’ 
(occurs with frequency p) and E2 the ‘uncommon state’ (occurs with frequency 1-p).  
A play of the game begins when the current state of the environment is set by 
some random process, using the complementary event probabilities from the flag-model 
(E1 with probability p, E2 with probability 1-p). We assume the signaler has perfect 
information about the current environmental state and the receiver does not. The signaler 
can then use one of two signal states to indicate the current state to the receiver. We refer 
to these possible signal states as M1 and M2. The signaler controls the reliability of the 
signal ( ) by the extent to which its choice of signal state correlates to the state of the 
environment over time. We further divide signal reliability into two component 
reliabilities: q1 for reliability in the common state (E1) and q2 for reliability in the 
uncommon state (E2). For example, when the state is E1, the signaler emits the M1 signal 
a proportion q1 of the time and emits the M2 signal (1-q1) of the time (see Table 2A).  
In the flag-model, the reliability of the cue (q) is equivalent in the common state 
and the uncommon state. That is, regardless of the current state, the receiver observes the 
signal which indicates the correct state a proportion q of the time. Here the average 
reliability, , that determines whether the receiver should follow signals depends on the 
two component reliabilities, q1 and q2, but also on the frequency of each state (where  
= ). We refer to the signaler’s ability to set each component of reliability 
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independently as ‘strategic reliability’. We restrict these component q values, such that 
 ≥ 0.5. If, instead,  < 0.5, then a receiver following signals should switch the sense 
of the signal, reversing the signal’s meaning (i.e., choose A2 in response to M1 and A1 
for M2). Thus, by restricting   ≥ 0.5, we assume a receiver playing  our ‘Follow’ 
strategy uses the information in the signal and chooses the best signal convention, 
reversing signal meaning when necessary.  
After the signaler chooses a signal state, according to , the receiver can then view 
or otherwise perceive the signal state before choosing an action. Again, the receiver’s 
choice of action is important to the signaler because the combination of the current 
environmental state and the receiver action determines the payoff for both individuals.  
As in the flag-model, the receiver is rewarded for matching its actions to the current state 
of the environment (Table 2B). The receiver action the signaler prefers in each state is 
determined by the variables x and y, respectively (Table 2B). The signaler has an 
incentive to decrease reliability if it prefers the opposite action of the receiver. For 
example, if x>0, the signaler obtains a higher benefit when the receiver chooses A2, 
rather than A1, in the environmental state E1. When the individuals’ interests conflict in 
this way, decreases in reliability lead to the action the signaler prefers, at the expense of 
the receiver. Thus the signaler should decrease q1 if x > 0 and decrease q2 if y > 0.  
Signaler and receiver strategies 
 Table 3 shows the game table and payoffs for the signaler and receiver; with 
payoffs based on two receiver strategies (Follow signals and Ignore signals) and two 
forms of signaler strategy (Signal and No signal). In the Signal strategy, the signaler 
chooses a level of reliability for each state (q1 and q2) which results in an overall 
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reliability  ≥ 0.5.  Based on the game structure outlined above, if the receiver follows 
the signals given, the signaler’s payoff function depends on each component reliability: 
SS,F = p(1-q1)x + (1-p)(1-q2)y. Whenever the signaler honestly signals the current state to 
a signal-following receiver (q1 = q2 = 1), its payoff  is SS,F =0. The signaler earns x when 
the receiver makes a mistake in the common state (occurs 1-q1 of the time, by definition) 
and earns y when the receiver makes a mistake in the uncommon state (occurs 1-q2 of the 
time). The receiver’s payoff for the follow strategy is RF,S = pq1 + (1-p)q2 and its payoff 
is RI,S  = p if it ignores signals (instead choosing the action that is best, on average). In the 
No Signal strategy, the signaler simply chooses not to signal. The receiver must choose 
an action without the signal in this case, and so always chooses action A1 (which is the 
correct action in E1, the common state). Thus SN,F = SN,I = (1-p)y and RF,N = RI,N  = p 
when the signaler uses the No Signal strategy.  
Basic signaling game: stable equilibria 
In the following paragraphs we evaluate the stability of the Signal/Follow 
strategies. Signal/Follow is a stable equilibrium for the signaler strategy set of q1 and q2 
when the following conditions hold: 
1
 
For the receiver: 
Equation 1)  RF,S > RI,S   
   
 And, for the signaler:  
                                                 
1
 Note, the following equations use strict inequalities. Whereas weak Nash Equilibria exist when 
two expected values are equivalent, we assume the payoff for the Signal strategy and the Follow 
strategy must be strictly greater than the No Signal and Ignore strategies, respectively. We make 
this assumption based on the observation that signaling and signal following likely incur a small 
cost. 
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Equation 2)  SS,F > SN,F 
   ) 
These two conditions require that neither the signaler nor the receiver can benefit by 
unilaterally switching strategies. We initially solve for the when Eq. 1 is true, showing 
the range of q1 and q2 conditions where signal following benefits the receiver when 
compared to ignoring the signal (choosing the action that is best on average). From the 
flag-model, we know SS,F > SN,F whenever  > p, where our average reliability  
depends on the component reliabilities q1 and q2. We then evaluate the maximum of SS,F 
within a restricted range (1 ≥   ≥ p) determined by Eq. 1 to demonstrate whether there 
exists a q1,q2  strategy set that fulfills the conditions for Eq. 1 and Eq. 2; such a q1, q2 set 
would result in a stable Signal/Follow equilibrium with respect to No Signal (on the part 
of the signaler) and Ignore (on the part of the receiver).  
Notice, however, that it is also possible the signaler could increase its overall 
payoff with an alternative Signal strategy; i.e., a different q1, q2 pair outside the range 
where receivers follow signals. The initial analysis above does not consider the range 
between 0.5 ≤ q ≤ p. Assuming the signaler is free to explore all q1 and q2 combinations 
(i.e., considering the entire range 0.5 ≤  ≤ 1), the stability of the Signal/Follow 
strategies then requires an additional third condition for the signaler: 
 Equation 3) SS,F (q1,q2) =  [SS,F (q1, q2)]  
Equation 3 holds when the signaler cannot obtain a higher payoff for alternative values of 
q (the strategy set q1,q2  is the maximum of the signaler’s payoff function, given that the 
receiver uses the Follow strategy). Because SS,F (q1,q2) is linear with respect to both 
arguments, we know  [SS,F (q1,q2)] occurs at the boundaries of the conditions for q1 
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and q2, where 0.5 ≤   ≤ 1; this is a problem solved via linear programming. Figure 2 
shows an example of the full set of q1, q2 conditions where  ≥ 0.5. We know the 
maximum payoff, for the signaler, will occur at one of the four vertices (1,1),  (1, 0) , 
(  , 1) or ( , 0) (where these are q-value strategy sets in the form (q1, q2)). If all 
three equations are true, we can say Signal(q1,q2)/Follow is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) 
with respect to the both the No Signal strategy and all alternative Signal strategies.  From 
the signaler payoff function, the sign of x determines whether SS,F is an increasing or 
decreasing function with respect to q1, and y determines whether SS,F is an increasing or 
decreasing function with respect to q2. As such, we analyze stability for separate cases:1)  
x and y < 0; 2) x > 0 and y < 0; 3) x < 0 and y > 0; and 4) x and y > 0. 
Case 1 – complete shared interest (x<0; y<0) 
As in the flag-model, RF,S > RI,S whenever  ≥ p; following signals is best when 
the average reliability level ( ) exceeds the uncertainty in the environment (p). To find 
if there exists q1, q2 conditions where Signal is also better than No Signal for the signaler, 
we can then solve for  [SS,F (q1,q2)] within the restricted range where  ≥ p (the 
region where RF,S > RI,S). To begin, we note the signaler’s payoff (SS,F) increases with 
respect to q1 and q2 because both x and y are negative values. Thus the overall maximum 
of SF,S occurs at (1,1), including when we consider the full range of q-values where  ≥ 
0.5. Thus Signal(1,1)/Follow is a Nash Equilibrium, with respect to No Signal and all 
other signal reliability sets q1,q2; an intuitive result because both individuals benefit from 
correct receiver decisions, and increasing q-values increases these correct decisions. The 
only minor exception to this equilibrium is that in completely certain environments 
(p=1.0) all signal reliability strategies would be weak NE (SS,F = SN,F =1), because the 
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receiver can choose correctly regardless of signal reliability and so all reliability 
strategies are equivalent. Given signaling and signal following come with some costs, 
however, we expect Not Signal and Ignore to yield higher payoffs when p=1.0. 
Case 2 – shared interest in the uncommon state, conflict common (x>0; y<0) 
RF,S > RI,S again whenever  ≥ p, and we again solve for the maximum payoff for 
the signaler within this restricted range to show whether it is possible that SS,F > SN,F. 
When there is shared interest in the uncommon state, we begin by setting q2 = 1 because 
SS,F =  is an increasing function with respect to q2. The 
signalers payoff is then SS,F = , which we can easily compare to SN,I = 
. We find SS,F > SN,I for all values of q1 because SS,F  ≥ 0 (since x>0) and SN,I < 0 
(y<0). Here, maintaining signal following by the receiver always yields a higher payoff 
for the signaler and so signaling always benefits the signaler; there clearly exist q1, q2 
conditions where Signal/Follow benefits both individuals. We also check the critical level 
q1 that ensures receivers profit from a signal following strategy, which occurs when  ≥ 
p, setting q2 = 1 (where, again,   = ). We find signalers need to 
maintain a level of reliability such that ; only then should receivers 
continue to follow the signal. Since SS,F decreases with respect to q1, we know SS,F is 
maximized at ( , given the restriction  ≥ p. 
 We next determine if the possible Signal/Follow equilibrium above is stable over 
the entire range of q-values available to the signaler (1 ≥  ≥ 0.5). Again x > 0, and so 
the signaler maximizes its payoff by decreasing q1, here.to q1= . We then compare 
to the No Signal payoff and find SS,F =  > SN,F =  because x > 0 and y < 0. 
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However, we also find  = 0.5 ≤ p and so RF,S ≤ RI,S for the set of reliability levels 
( , 1). Therefore, the Signal/Follow equilibrium is not stable in this case; signalers 
benefit from decreasing reliability past the critical level necessary to maintain the 
incentive for receivers to follow signals. 
Case 3 – shared interest in the common state, conflict rare (x<0; y>0) 
 In this case of conflict in the uncommon state, SS,F increases with respect to q1 and 
decreases with respect to q2. Thus setting q1 =1 and decreasing q2 increases the expected 
value of the Signal strategy when the receiver follows signals. When q1 = 1, the 
minimum of the second reliability component is q2 =0, such that SS,F = (1-p)y. The 
average reliability for this strategy set is  = p, so this is the maximum of SS,F  whether 
we consider the range 1 ≥  ≥ 0.5 or 1 ≥  ≥ p. The default action of a receiver that 
acts without signals is A1 (because A1 is the correct action for the receiver in the 
common state, E1). Here the signaler is always rewarded when the receiver chooses 
action A1. A signaler’s payoff from this receiver strategy is SN,F =SN,I = (1-p)y, which is 
equivalent to the maximum payoff for SS,F in this case. Thus SN,F ≥ SS,F, and the 
Signal/Follow equilibrium is not stable for any reliability strategy set. 
Case 4 – No shared interest between signaler and receiver (x>0; y>0) 
Next we examine whether circumstances exist where the signaler and receiver 
both benefit from signaling, despite completely conflicting interests. This is more 
complicated than previous cases because signalers could reduce q1 or q2, and either 
reduction would benefit the signaler. To begin, we assume the signaler initially partitions 
all decreased reliability into the condition where it pays the most, similar to Case 2, 
because these reductions in reliability are limited. 
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When y > x, we initially hold q1=1 and solve for when  ≥ p; that is, when is p 
+ q1 (1-p) > p. We find the signaler can reduce q2  to 0, but even then the expected value 
of  SS,F = SN,F. Decreasing q1 would only further decrease  to the point where  < p, 
meaning receivers would not benefit from following signals. Thus no q1, q2 conditions 
exist where the signaler and receiver both benefit at the Signal/Follow equilibrium. 
Alternatively, when y < x, we let q2=1. Similar to case of partial interest (Case 2), 
 ≥ p if q1 ≥  and so SS,F = (1-p)x which is always greater than SN,F = (1-p)y 
(because here y < x). Overall, signalers and receivers can simultaneously benefit from 
communication under complete conflicts of interest, but only when y < x (when the 
outcome in the more common state is more economically important to the signaler). 
We next consider for the overall maximum of SS,F where 1 ≥  ≥ 0.5. Again, SS,F  
is decreasing with respect to q1 and q2 (x and y > 0), so  [SS,F (q1 q2)] occurs at one 
of the two strategy sets (  , 1) and ( , 0). Both of these strategies sets yield an 
average reliability of  = 0.5. Thus, regardless of which strategy set is best for the 
signaler, the receiver does not follow signals because  = 0.5 ≤ p, and so RI,S ≤ RF,S and 
signal following is not stable (again, assuming some small cost to the Follow strategy). In 
complete conflicts of interest, no Signal/Follow strategy that is stable against all possible 
q1, q2 values (for the signaler) and the Ignore strategy (for the receiver) when both x and y 
> 0. 
Basic signaling game: results summary and discussion 
We focus on the solutions where the Signal/Follow equilibrium is stable because 
this equilibrium fits within the commonly accepted definitions of communication (e.g., 
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Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 2011; Hauser, 1996; Searcy & Nowicki, 2005). Figure 3 
summarizes the conditions where q1, q2 strategy sets exist that could stabilize 
Signal/Follow with respect to the No Signal strategy (specifically in range 1 ≥  ≥ p). 
Figure 4 illustrates whether these possible q1, q2 solutions are also stable against all 
possible q1, q2 strategies from 1 ≥  ≥ 0.5 (where 0.5 is the minimum average 
reliability). Common interest and the base rate of events together determine whether q1, 
q2 conditions exist where both individuals benefit from a Signal/Follow equilibrium 
(Figure 3). Partial common interest is not always sufficient to create conditions where 
both individuals can benefit from signaling (quadrant [i]) and under other conditions 
partial common interest is not necessary (quadrant [ii] and when x > y). These results 
generally agree with other ‘economics of signaling’ approaches that explore the value of 
communication (Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 2000), but they do not fully characterize the 
stability of  communication in a game theoretic context (see Godfrey-Smith & Martínez, 
2013) if signalers are completely free to vary q1 and q2. It is also important to determine 
whether the Signal/Follow equilibrium is stable when compared with all other signal 
reliability strategy sets. Evaluating the additional third stability condition, where the 
signaler is free to choose any reliability level where  ≥ 0.5, we find that a 
Signal/Follow strategy pair is only stable when the signaler and receiver always agree on 
the best receiver action (Figure 4). 
Comparing the two analyses recaptures the classic conundrum in signaling theory, 
the ‘problem of reliability’, but the problem is only present in certain conditions (the 
cross-hatched region in Figure 3). In each case of conflict (whether partial or complete), 
the signaler payoff function SS,F increases with decreasing q-values in at least one of the 
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environmental states; i.e., decreasing reliability pays. In a subset of these conditions of 
conflict, intermediate q-values (1 ≥  ≥ p) would maintain signal following and yield a 
higher payoff for both individuals when compared to the No Signal and Ignore strategies, 
but the incentive to decrease q pushes the signaler strategy past the breaking point  = 
p. Thus we see conflicts of interest cause signalers to reduce reliability (decrease ), 
receivers stop paying attention (use the Ignore strategy) and communication breaks down 
(Signal/Follow equilibrium is no longer stable). The model re-characterizes this ‘problem 
of reliability’ in a signaling game with a more realistic, flexible receiver strategist by 
utilizing the flag-model of receiver behavior. This approach allows us to address several 
key issues related to the problem of reliability: it eliminates the false dichotomy between 
reliable and unreliable signals; it specifies the receiver’s alternative to following signals; 
and it highlights the important themes of the base rate of events and uncertainty in the 
environment. 
Partial reliability and strategic signal reliability 
Framing our signaling game around the flag-model sets a clear minimum level of 
reliability (  ≥ p) necessary to maintain receiver signal-following behavior. 
Descriptions of communication stability frequently oversimplify the issue of signal 
reliability, characterizing receiver behavior as following reliable signals and ignoring 
unreliable ones. Yet the breaking point between reliability and unreliability is left 
undefined, leaving no information regarding the level of partial reliability necessary to 
maintain receiver signal-following behavior. Economic models of communication, in 
particular Bradbury and Vehrencamp (2000), help us recognize the importance of graded 
reliability and discuss the minimum level of reliability which maintains receiver signal 
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use. Our model adds a significant element to this body of literature by considering 
strategic reliability (i.e., state dependent reliability levels). This is important because 
when incentives align in a particular environmental state, there is no reason for signalers 
to signal deceptively in that state. 
To meet the critical reliability level,  ≥ p in our model, signalers must manage 
the frequency of mismatches between signal state and environmental state. In the context 
of signaling, it is possible for reliability to benefit the signaler in one state while 
deception pays in the other state (our independently varying x and y capture this 
possibility). From the signaler’s perspective, it is inefficient to use up any mismatches 
between signal and environmental state (a reduction in observed reliability ) when 
incentives align. Thus, it is critical to allow signalers to set reliability independently in 
each state – to signal reliably when both individuals agree on the best receiver action and 
unreliably when the signaler is rewarded for receiver mistakes. Despite the importance of 
this strategic reliability, theoretical treatments of animal communication often use a 
simpler universal level of reliability (e.g., Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 2000; Hackett, 
Schaefer, & Ruxton, 2014) or only consider perfectly reliable (q=1) versus perfectly 
unreliable signals (q=0), as in the Sir Philip Sidney (SPS) game (Maynard Smith, 1991). 
Adding strategic reliability leads to different conclusions for some ‘problem of 
reliability’ models, such as the SPS game. For example, including partial reliability in the 
SPS model changes whether the base rate of events and uncertainty in the environment 
(p) are important in the game solutions (see discussion on these topics to follow). The 
concept of strategic reliability may also help researchers identify cases of true deception 
in animal signaling, rejecting alternatives such as simple signaler error, because we 
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expect certain patterns in the state dependent reliability – greater reductions in reliability 
in the environmental states where individuals disagree on the best action (Searcy & 
Nowicki, 2005; Zollman, Bergstrom, & Huttegger, 2013). 
Base rate and receiver averaging 
Similar to the value of signals or cues from a receiver’s perspective (Dall, 
Giraldeau, Olsson, McNamara, & Stephens, 2005; McLinn & Stephens, 2006), the value 
of providing signals, for the signaler, is set by whether the decisions of an informed 
receiver yield a higher payoff than the decisions of a receiver that is forced to choose the 
one action that is best on average (in agreement with Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 2000). 
The key difference is that the signaler is unable to select what action an uninformed 
receiver chooses. Instead, the commonness of events determines the receiver’s default 
strategy, which is then critical in defining whether communication can benefit the 
signaler. The base rate of the two states of the environment shifts the signalers incentive 
to provide information via signals – especially when there is conflict between the signaler 
and receiver.  
The clearest example of this phenomenon is the comparison of conditions of 
partially opposed incentives. The signaler can benefit from signaling only when the 
condition of conflict is common. Otherwise, when conflict is rare, the receiver’s default 
action agrees with the signaler’s preferences in both conditions. Here the standard 
‘problem of reliability’ remains unchanged when conflict is common: the signaler always 
benefits from communication in this case, but incentives to decrease reliability destabilize 
the Signal/Follow equilibrium. On the other hand, signalers should be uninterested in 
maintaining communication when the condition of conflict is rare, and this presents an 
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entirely different challenge to the stability of communication. Our extension of the basic 
model explores this concept further (see Signaling game extension: costly signals). 
The commonness of environmental conditions and their relative payoffs also 
regulates whether there is an economic imperative for the signaler to provide signals in 
the incentives completely opposed case. When the more common environmental 
condition has higher stakes for the signaler there is more to gain from signaling (a higher 
expected value from maintaining the Signal/Follow equilibrium). This is because when 
signaling fails the receiver’s default action prevents the signaler from obtaining the 
higher payoff, and does so quite frequently. If the signaler and receiver always disagree 
on the best option, but one state provides a larger reward, the signaler can essentially 
‘buy credibility’ by signaling reliably in the environmental state where it has 
comparatively little to gain. 
Uncertainty and receiver tolerance for imperfect reliability 
Research shows that environmental uncertainty (p near 0.5 in our model) creates 
receiver tolerance for imperfectly reliable signals; that is, uncertainty predisposes 
receivers to follow signals (e.g., Dunlap & Stephens, 2009; McLinn & Stephens, 2006; 
Polnaszek & Stephens, 2014a). The model we outline here is based on the flag-model of 
receiver behavior, and so our receiver’s decision to follow signals also depends on the 
interaction between uncertainty and the average reliability of the signal (follow signals 
when  ≥ p). The significance of the relative frequency of each environmental condition 
and its relationship with signal reliability extends to the signaler, because uncertainty sets 
the limit for strategic reductions in reliability. For example, when signaler and receiver 
disagree in the common state (Case 2 in the model), we find signalers need to maintain a 
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level of reliability in the state of conflict such that ; only then should 
receivers continue to follow the signal. This inequality can be rearranged to 
, where  is a measure of dishonesty (a decrease in reliability) and  is the 
relative likelihood of the uncommon state. Therefore, dishonesty is limited by the relative 
likelihood of the state the signaler is dishonestly indicating; receivers should tolerate 
lower levels of dishonesty as this likelihood decreases.  
Thus uncertainty in the environment determines the extent to which signalers can 
reduce reliability and yet still maintain receiver signal following. When p=0.5, the 
environment is uncertain and receivers should tolerate of imperfect reliability (referred to 
as receiver tolerance). Alternatively, if p = 0.99, signals become useless if they are 
anything less than perfectly reliable ( =1). Of course, the effects of receiver tolerance 
on the stability of signaling depend on how free the signaler is to reduce reliability. We 
end up with the ‘problem of reliability’ if signalers can completely reduce reliability in 
cases of conflict. However, dishonesty may be limited for various reasons (see Enquist, 
Hurd, & Ghirlanda, 2010; Maynard Smith, 1982; Searcy & Nowicki, 2005), and then the 
stability of communication would depend on the interaction between these limitations on 
signal reliability and receiver tolerance for imperfect reliability. 
Overall, uncertainty in the environment should be important in all communication 
contexts (e.g., each of our cases of shared and conflicting interests) because receivers’ 
decisions always depend on the interaction between p and . Yet this issue is often 
finessed (e.g., models assume p=0.5) or simply ignored in discussions of animal 
communication (discussed in McLinn & Stephens, 2010; Polnaszek & Stephens, 2014a; 
Searcy & Nowicki, 2005). Uncertainty should create opportunity for signalers to reduce 
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reliability in conditions of conflict (as discussed above), but also minimize receiver 
demands on signal reliability in mutualistic cases. We know that the perceived reliability 
of a signal is reduced by noise and other factors (Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 2011; Wiley, 
1994), and signal design must overcome these reductions in perceived reliability. 
Communication should be more easily maintained despite partial reliability when the 
environment is uncertain (p near 0.5) because small reductions in reliability will not 
prompt receivers to ignore signals; this is true whether the realized imperfect reliability is 
determined by strategic deception, signaler errors, or errors in receiver perception. 
Signaling game extension: costly signals 
In this section we develop an extension to our basic model of signaler-receiver 
interactions. The extended model focuses on signal cost, which is an important reliability 
enforcement mechanism and the most discussed solution to the important ‘problem of 
reliability’. 
 Signal costs, or handicaps, are considered by many to be critical to the 
maintenance of communication (see Grafen, 1990; A. Zahavi, 1975; Amotz Zahavi, 
Zahavi, Balaban, & Ely, 1999, etc.). Here we explore the effects of signal costs by 
building on the flag-model signaling game developed above. When implementing signal 
costs into the signaling game, various cost structures are possible. For example, costs 
may depend on the type of signal, the state of the environment, or an interaction between 
the two and these differences cost structure can have important implications in the 
outcome of signaling interactions (Polnaszek & Stephens, 2015; Számadó & Penn, 2015). 
Here we create a generalized cost structure, with the variables c1 through c4 controlling 
the costs of signaling (see Table 4). We continue to use the generalized signaler payoff 
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structure (see Table 2B) from the basic model above. We analyze two cases from our 
general model, both where incentives partially oppose: 1) when the signaler’s and 
receiver’s interests conflict in the common state (Case 2 above, when when x>0; y<0) 
and 2) when interests conflict in the uncommon state (Case 3 above, when x<0; y>0). 
From the general signaler payoff structure, when we add signal costs: 
SS,F =  
Signal costs when there is conflict in the common state, x>0, y<0 
Using the results from the general signaling game without signal costs, we know  
 [SS,F (q1,q2)] occurs when the signaler chooses the reliabilities ( ,1). We will 
refer to this reliability set as the Dishonesty strategy (SD). We also consider the perfect 
reliability signaler strategy (1,1), referred to as the Honesty strategy (SH). Table 5A 
compares the payoffs for these signaler strategies, as well as the No Signal strategy, when 
played against the receiver strategies Follow and Ignore. To determine when signal costs 
enforce honesty and stabilize the Honest/Follow equilibrium, we simply need to compare 
the values in the top row (under the Honesty strategy, Follow is the best receiver strategy, 
RF,H=1). Honesty is better than Dishonesty when:  
 < .  
Solving the inequality, signal cost maintains Honesty, with respect to the Dishonesty 
strategy, whenever . The variable x is the change in payoff, for the signaler, 
when the receiver’s action changes from ‘A1’ to ‘A2’ in the common state (this is a 
change from the correct response to the incorrect one, from the receiver’s perspective). 
We also evaluate the conditions where Honesty exceeds the benefits a No Signal strategy. 
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As in the general model, the No Signal payoff is SN,F= SN,I=(1-p)y. Thus Honesty yields 
higher benefits whenever: 
  < , or we can rearrange to  
Here the variable y represents a loss to the signaler (y < 0), and this loss must be greater 
than the right hand side, which depends on p and the two costs of honestly signaling the 
true environmental states (c1 and c4).  
Signal costs when there is conflict in the uncommon state, x<0, y>0 
 In this case,  [SS,F (q1,q2)] occurs when the signaler signals with the 
reliability set (1,0). We redefine the Dishonesty strategy set for this case as q1=1, q2=0, 
but keep the same Honesty definition (q1=1, q2=1). Table 5B outlines the game table 
comparing these updated strategy definitions. Honesty (SH,F) exceeds Dishonesty (SD,F)  
whenever: 
 <  
Rearranging the terms above, we see that SH,F > SD,F if . Similar to Case 2 in 
the cost model, Honesty is better than Dishonesty when the costs of changing the 
receiver’s response in the environmental state of conflict  exceeds the benefit 
(y). However, when we compare Honesty and the No Signal strategy (SN,F): 
 <  
Assuming positive costs of signaling, the right hand side above is negative. Therefore the 
No Signal strategy payoff (which is positive, y>0) always exceeds the Honesty payoff. 
From the basic signaling game, we also know No Signal exceeds Dishonesty, too (see 
Case 3 in the basic signaling game). 
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Costly signals results summary and discussion 
 The results demonstrate that signal costs can enforce the Honesty, but only in 
certain circumstances. Signal costs stabilize Honesty when there is a conflict of interest in 
the common state (Case 2, where x > 0 and y < 0). In this situation, though, only two of 
the four signal costs are important in preventing the Dishonest strategy; SH,F ≥ SD,F when 
 > x. In contrast, signal costs cannot change the stability of signaling (whether 
Honesty or Dishonesty) if the signaler and receiver only disagree on the best action in the 
uncommon state (Case 3, when  x<0 and  y>0) and the No Signal strategy is best.  
Signal costs and the ‘problem of reliability’ 
Literature on animal communication presents signal costs as a solution to the 
‘problem of reliability’. Our results support this assertion in some conditions, but not all 
(c.f. Zahavi, 1977). Evaluating whether there exists a strategy set q1,q2 where both 
signaler and receiver could benefit from signaling in the basic model provided insight 
into the conditions (e.g., x and y values) where the stability of communication may be 
salvaged by reliability enforcement mechanisms (signal costs, in this model). The No 
Signal strategy is already better than the Signal strategy when conflicts of interest are 
uncommon, and the cascade of events leading to the ‘problem of reliability’ never occurs 
when the signaler is uninterested in signaling at any reliability level. Adding signal costs 
only serves to further decrease the value of signaling (SH,F or SD,F) when compared to the 
payoff from simply not signaling (SN,F). When considering further extensions to the basic 
model, this may serve as an example of how to predict which mechanism(s) could 
stabilize communication in different circumstances. For example, perhaps manipulation, 
receiver biases or sensory exploitation (see Endler & Basolo, 1998; Ryan, Fox, 
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Wilczynski, & Rand, 1990; Trivers, 1974) are more important for maintaining 
communication in cases where signal reliability enforcement mechanisms are unlikely to 
have any effects. 
Which costs enforce honesty? 
When signalers and receivers disagree in the common state, costs stabilize 
Honesty with respect to Dishonesty whenever the marginal cost of indicating the 
uncommon state when the common state is true  exceeds the benefit gained by 
this dishonest signal (x). Though there are four possible signal-state costs (c1 through c4) 
only two (c1 and c3) have any effect on the ‘problem of reliability’ (i.e., the stability of 
Honesty compared to Dishonesty). This is a critically important point because it shows 
how measuring a signal cost in nature is far from sufficient to demonstrate whether signal 
costs enforce honesty (see Lachmann, Szamado, & Bergstrom, 2001; Searcy & Nowicki, 
2005; Számadó, 2011); especially because some costs of honest signals (i.e., c4), which 
are completely unimportant when comparing Honesty and Dishonesty, may be the easiest 
to measure in signaling systems (Grose, 2011; Kotiaho, 2001). Moreover, measured 
signal costs in nature are often considered too small to be consistent with the ‘cost 
enforced honesty’ idea (reviewed in Bergstrom & Lachmann, 1998). But the costs of 
honest signaling (i.e., c1 and c4) are necessarily small; otherwise the expected value of the 
No Signal strategy would exceed that of the Honesty strategy.  
Resolving disagreements between theoretical and empirical ‘signal costs’ research 
The results of our ‘signal cost’ model reinforce the growing disparity between 
theoretical predictions in the costly signaling literature and empirical studies of signal 
costs. These differences exist primarily because it is difficult to separate and manipulate 
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the necessary costs (c3 and c1) to test whether costs enforce honesty (which is the central 
claim of the handicap principle and costly signaling literature). In addition to the issues 
raised above, cost is predicted to be unimportant in stabilizing Honesty if interests are 
completely aligned (when x and y < 0,  model above, Bergstrom & Lachmann, 1998; 
Maynard Smith, 1991), in this case there is no incentive to signal dishonestly. These 
disparities call for novel approaches to studying costly signaling, approaches that 
recognize and address this disconnect between the existing costly signaling literature and 
the question of why signals are reliable (Kotiaho, 2001; Polnaszek & Stephens, 2014b; 
Számadó, 2011). Both separating and manipulating the four distinct signal costs are 
critical challenges for future costly signaling research, because each cost influences 
signaling stability in different ways. 
Further questions and model extensions 
Here we use the receiver economic approach (when does it pay to follow signals) 
as the foundation of our model, incorporating signaler behavior into the flag-model of 
receiver behavior. Readers may note that while we address a few important assumptions 
regarding the problem of reliability, communication can be more complex than the 
simple signal-response game presented here (e.g., more than two environmental states or 
graded signal states). In the next paragraphs we discuss two potentially important 
extensions to our model, but recognize this does not represent an exhaustive list. 
A hallmark of the flag-model is its simplicity and extensibility, so a natural next 
step is to build on the flag-model and change our assumptions of receiver behavior. Here 
we consider the strategies of individuals in a game theory context, and an excellent way 
to add further complexity to our game is to consider themes from receiver psychology 
   28 
(Guilford & Dawkins, 1991), such how receivers respond to imperfectly discriminable 
signals. The current model assumes the signaler fully controls the average reliability of 
signals, but this reliability is decreased if the receiver sometimes makes mistakes in 
identifying signals. For example, if an honest M1 signal is perceived as M2, this leads to 
the incorrect action A2. The perceived signal was unreliable in this instance, from the 
perspective of the receiver. Borrowing from signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 
1966; Wiley, 1994), we could vary the discriminability of the two signal states and 
evaluate 1) the stability of communication and 2) the conditions where signalers should 
invest in making the signal states more easily discriminable. For example, when 
individuals disagree on the best action, mistakes in signal assignment could actually 
benefit the signaler. Exploring signaler investment in the distinctiveness of signal states 
would also connect the model results with ideas of signal exaggeration and 
conspicuousness (Dawkins & Guilford, 1997; Enquist & Arak, 1998). This and other 
extensions to this basic game that build from receiver perception and processing of 
signals should help bridge the gap between game theoretical and receiver psychology 
approaches, which are sometimes cast as polemical opposites.  
 Another extension would be considering the strategic use of combinations of 
multiple signals. Until this point, we have considered a signaling system where the 
signaler uses one simple signal that can take on only two signal states. Yet some argue 
that such a simplified signaling system is rare in nature, and instead many systems 
involve signals with multiple components or multiple signals (Hebets & Papaj, 2004; 
Partan & Marler, 1999); we will refer to these as ‘complex signals’. For example, male 
wolf spiders of the genus Habronattus use complex signals with a combination of sound, 
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color and movement when courting females (Elias, Maddison, Peckmezian, Girard, & 
Mason, 2012). Each of these components could be assessed by the female when making 
her mate choice decisions, but in theory she could consider them independently or in 
some combination. In the context of our game, we expect the use of complex signals 
could function as ‘backup messages’ (Rufus A. Johnstone, 1996) when the payoff 
outcome of a signaling interaction is especially high (x and y take on extreme values in 
our model). In cases of conflict, signalers benefit from receiver mistakes, so we could 
also ask whether combinations of signals exist that enable signalers to more easily elicit 
their preferred receiver responses at the expense of the receivers. In general, complex 
signals are thought to benefit receivers for various psychological and signal processing 
reasons (e.g., learned faster or remember longer, Rowe, 1999). Recent research shows 
that certain environmental uncertainty conditions also favor the use of complex signals 
from an economic perspective (Rubi & Stephens, in press). Given the relative abundance 
of complex signals and their emphasis in animal signaling literature (see Hebets & Papaj, 
2004; Higham & Hebets, 2013; S. R. Partan, 2013; Rowe, 1999, etc.), it is important to 
ask what conditions create an advantage for signalers sending these complex signals that 
would also fit the expectations for receiver complex signal use. 
Final Summary 
The simple structure of the flag-model has proven rather powerful in predicting 
receivers’ use of cues on multiple timescales. The key prediction, that receivers are 
sensitive to the interaction of environmental certainty (related to the base rate of events) 
and signal reliability has been repeatedly tested empirically; both through studies on 
learned cue use (McLinn & Stephens, 2006, 2010) and evolved cue use (Dunlap & 
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Stephens, 2009, 2014). The simplicity of the flag-model has also enabled researchers to 
build upon it and explore additional phenomena, such as multicomponent signal use 
(Rubi & Stephens, in press) or social information use (Heinen & Stephens, in press). 
Because the flag-model identifies situations where receivers are most likely to follow 
partially reliable signals or cues in its external environment, it also provides an excellent 
way to generate predictions of signalers strategic use of signals on a continuum from 
perfectly reliable to completely unreliable.  
Here we extend the flag-model by considering signal reliability that is set by a 
signaler whose payoff is contingent on the receiver’s choice of action, rather than a cue 
set exogenously by the environment. Our model adds to current theoretical literature by 
reframing the classic ‘problem of reliability’ and highlighting the comparison between 
conditions where communication is mutually beneficial to both parties and the overall 
stability of communication, which are sometimes taken as equivalent (Godfrey-Smith & 
Martínez, 2013). We discuss how identifying conditions where signaling is valuable to 
both players, but communication may not be stable, should prove useful when 
considering the interplay between reliability enforcement mechanisms and receiver 
biases. Moreover, signaling systems may never evolve to their equilibrium points 
(Enquist, Arak, Ghirlanda, & Wachtmeister, 2002; Enquist et al., 2010), so broadening 
our search for conditions that enable communication helps overcome this limitation of 
game theoretic approaches.  
Our results suggest important roles for the base rate of events and uncertainty in 
the environment in signaling games. We find that conflict in the common state may result 
in the ‘problem of reliability’, but conflict only in the uncommon state does not – instead 
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we have the problem of ‘no signaling’. Uncertainty changes the extent to which receivers 
will continue to follow signals despite reduced reliability. This is a concept we refer to as 
receiver tolerance, and it represents a significant yet under-studied complement to signal 
reliability (Polnaszek & Stephens, 2014a). The importance of environmental uncertainty 
emerges from our consideration of strategic (or partial) reliability; removing strategic 
reliability diminishes the role of uncertainty in signaling games.  
Overall, we advocate an approach that combines economic models of 
communication with the more typical signal reliability models. Such an approach would 
focus on integrating two key questions underlying communication 1) ‘when should 
signalers communicate reliably?’ and 2) ‘to what extent should receivers tolerate 
imperfect reliability’? We argue that these two questions are at the heart of 
communication, yet the field of animal communication tends to either focus exclusively 
on signal reliability or consider mechanisms of receiver choice, but less frequently 
integrate the two halves. We hope this research provides a framework for future 
theoretical and empirical research to further connect ideas and themes from the literatures 
on signal honesty and receiver choice.  
 
 
  
   32 
Table 1.1 
Receiver payoffs, as determined by receiver action and environmental state 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Receiver Payoffs 
 
State E1 State E2 
Action A1 1 0 
Action A2 0 1 
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Table 1.2A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2B 
Signaling game payoffs for Receiver (upper) and Signaler (lower) given each 
combination of state and receiver action. 
 
 
 
 
 
Definitions of terms and variables 
p Probability of E1(the common state) 
1-p Probability of E2 (the uncommon state) 
q1 
Probability of M1|E1 
Reliability of the signal in the common state 
q2 
Probability of M2|E2 
Reliability of the signal in the uncommon state 
 
 = pq1 + (1-p)q2 
Average signal reliability, as observed by the receiver. 
Equivalent to the single q value in the flag-model.  
SS Payoff function for the signaler for a Signal strategy 
SN 
Payoff function for the signaler for a No Signal 
strategy 
RF Payoff function for the receiver for a Follow strategy 
RI Payoff function for the receiver for an Ignore strategy 
 
State E1 
(Common State) 
State E2 
(Uncommon State) 
Receiver Payoff   
Action A1 1 0 
Action A2 0 1 
Signaler Payoff   
Action A1 0 y 
Action A2 x 0 
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Table 1.3 
Payoff table for signalers for each strategy (Signal or No Signal) against receiver strategies (Follow or Ignore). 
 
 
 
Signaler Strategy 
 Signal with reliability  
(S) 
No Signal 
(N) 
R
ec
ei
v
er
 
S
tr
at
eg
y
 
Follow 
(F) 
 
SS,F  =  ] 
RF,S  = pq1 + (1-p)q2 
SN,F  =  
RF,N  = p 
Ignore 
(I) 
SS,I  =  
RI,S   = p 
SN,I  =  
RI,N  = p 
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Table 1.4 
Signal costs for each signal type in each state of the environment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Signal Costs 
 
State E1 
(Common State) 
State E2 
(Uncommon State) 
M1 
(indicates common state) 
c1 c2 
M2 
(indicates uncommon state) 
c3 c4 
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Table 1.5A 
Signaler payoffs for each strategy, Honesty, Dishonesty and No Signal when played against the receiver strategies (Follow or Ignore). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.5B 
Signaler payoffs for each strategy, Honesty, Dishonesty and No Signal when played against the receiver strategies (Follow or Ignore). 
 
 Signaler Strategy  
 
 Honest (q1 = q2 = 1) 
(H) 
Dishonesty (q1 = ( ), q2 = 1) 
(D) 
No Signal 
(N) 
R
ec
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v
er
 
S
tr
at
eg
y
 
Follow 
(F) 
SH,F = p  
RF,H =1 
SD,F =  
RF,D =  
SN,F =(1-p)y 
RF,N = p 
Ignore 
(I) 
SH,I =  
RI,H = p 
SD,I =  
RI,D = p 
SN,I= (1-p)y 
RI,N = p 
 Signaler Strategy  
  Honest (q1 = q2 = 1) 
(H) 
Dishonesty (q1 = 1, q2 = 0) 
(D) 
No Signal 
(N) 
R
ec
ei
v
er
 
S
tr
at
eg
y
 Follow 
(F) 
SH,F  = p  
RF,H =1 
SD,F  =   
RF,D = p 
SN,F =(1-p)y 
RF,N = p 
Ignore 
(I) 
SH,I =  
RI,H = p 
SD,I  =  
RI,D = p 
SN,I= (1-p)y 
RI,N = p 
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Figure 1.1: Payoffs for the receiver for choosing the single best action (solid lines) 
versus payoffs for following cues (dashed line). Following cues is best in the shaded 
region, when (1-p) < q < p. Adapted from McLinn and Stephens (2006). 
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Figure 1.2: An example of the constraints on q1 and q2. The shaded region shows the 
allowable strategy sets (q1, q2) where  ≥ 0.5. From linear programming (or linear 
optimization), we know the highest signaler payoff will occur at one of the four vertices 
of the shaded region.    
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Figure 1.3: The values x and y measure the conflict of interest between signaler and 
receiver, both individuals agree on the best receiver action when these variables take 
values less than zero (agree in the common state if x < 0, agree in the uncommon state if 
y < 0). We subdivided the graph into four quadrants. [i] Signaler and receiver disagree 
only in the uncommon state, [ii] signaler and receiver interests always conflict; [iii] 
signaler and receiver interests never in conflict; and [iv] signaler and receiver disagree 
only in the common state. Shading indicates whether q1,q2 conditions exist where SS,F > 
SS,F and RF,S > SI,S; where dark gray indicates no such conditions exist. Text labels and 
cross-hatching indicate the signaler strategy set, in the form (q1,q2), where Signal/Follow 
is stable and signalers earn the highest payoff within the range 1 ≥   ≥ p. The 
reliability set  is best in the cross-hatched region, and no cross-hatching 
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indicates (1,1) is best (not necessarily stable equilibria with respect to all other q1,q2 
strategy sets).  
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Figure 1.4: The values x and y measure the conflict of interest between signaler and 
receiver, both individuals agree on the best receiver action when these variables take 
values less than zero (agree in the common state if x < 0, agree in the uncommon state if y 
< 0). The Signal/Follow equilibrium is only stable in region [iii], where individuals agree 
on the best receiver action in both environmental states. In regions [ii] and [iv], 
Signal/Follow is not a stable equilibrium even though some Signal strategy sets (q1,q2) 
benefit both individuals compared to equilibria with the No Signal and/or Ignore strategy 
(see Figure 3). 
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Chapter 2: Receiver tolerance for imperfect signal reliability: 
results from experimental signaling games2 
Abstract 
 This paper presents an alternative approach to studying signaler-receiver interactions. 
The conventional approach focuses on signal reliability; instead, we focus on receivers’ 
willingness to tolerate imperfect reliability (receiver tolerance). Both approaches aim to 
explain what promotes and maintains communication. We define receiver tolerance as 
following a signal in the face of reduced reliability. We used experimental signaling 
games with blue jay subjects (Cyanocitta cristata) to demonstrate whether uncertain 
environments generate receiver tolerance for imperfect reliability. Many models of 
signaling games ignore environmental certainty or predictability, but this certainty is a 
key part of understanding receiver tolerance. For example, low environmental certainty 
should increase tolerance since receivers are more uncertain about which action to take. 
We also tested whether signalers exploit receiver tolerance by signaling dishonestly. The 
results show that receivers are more likely to heed signals when environments are 
uncertain. Moreover, signalers are sensitive to this receiver tolerance and, when signalers 
and receivers have opposing material interests, low environmental certainty promoted 
dishonest signaling and high certainty restricted it. Our results highlight the usefulness of 
an approach emphasizing receiver tolerance and demonstrate the critical importance of 
environmental certainty for signaler-receiver interactions. 
                                                 
2
 This chapter is published as: Polnaszek, T. J. & Stephens, D.W. (2014) Receiver tolerance for imperfect 
signal reliability: results from experimental signaling games. Animal Behaviour, 98 (1-8). 
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Introduction 
The literature of animal communication emphasizes signal reliability. Reliability 
is thought to present a problem, since signalers can often gain from dishonesty, but 
reducing reliability should destabilize signaler-receiver interactions. Maynard Smith and 
Harper (2003) called this problem of reliability “the central problem for evolutionary 
biologists interested in signals.” A huge literature exists on this ‘problem of reliability’ 
and the mechanisms that potentially prevent dishonesty (e.g., Maynard Smith, 1991; 
McGraw, Hill, & Parker, 2005; Polnaszek & Stephens, 2014b; Reby & McComb, 2003; 
Searcy & Nowicki, 2005; A. Zahavi, 1975). The “problem of reliability” arises because if 
a signaler reduces the reliability of its signal, the receiver may stop attending to the 
signal, so that the signal-response equilibrium becomes unstable. The problem of signal-
response stability is, therefore, jointly a problem of signaler reliability and receiver 
tolerance for imperfect reliability (or simply ‘receiver tolerance’); even though the 
determinants of the receiver’s willingness to follow imperfectly reliable signals are 
seldom addressed. Notice that we conceive of reliability as a continuous variable, so that 
a signal can be partially reliable. Receiver tolerance, then, measures the extent to which a 
receiver follows a signal in the face of reduced reliability. Receiver tolerance need not be 
an error; as we explain below, it can pay to follow a partially reliable signal. 
Our paper offers two experiments focused on receiver tolerance. These 
experiments seek to understand the conditions under which receivers are tolerant of 
imperfect reliability (i.e., the causes of receiver tolerance) and demonstrate the effects of 
receiver tolerance on signaler-receiver interactions (i.e., the consequences). To frame 
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these experiments, we develop simple model that asks when a receiver should follow a 
partially reliable signal.  
Imagine that a receiver faces a binary choice (say accept or reject, for 
concreteness) and it observes a partially reliable signal that indicates the correct action 
(meaning the one with the highest payoff) with probability q. An unreliable signal has a 
q=0.5 (it is just random noise), and perfectly reliable signal has a q=1.0 (it correlates with 
the correct action perfectly). Suppose, next that reject is the correct response with 
probability p (here termed environmental certainty). If p=1.0, the environment is certain 
and reject is always the correct action; if p=0.5 the environment is uncertain and the 
correct action is a 50/50 gamble. Thus as the parameter p varies from 0.5 to 1.0 it 
measures the receiver’s certainty about the environment. When p=0.5, the receiver is 
completely uncertain about how to act and when p=1.0 receivers can be certain the 
correct action is to reject.  
Clearly, the signal is most valuable to the receiver when it is most uncertain about 
the appropriate action. It follows that receivers can benefit from even an unreliable signal 
when environmental certainty is low. The higher the certainty, the more reliable a signal 
must be to merit the receiver’s attention. Figure 1 shows this logic graphically: more 
‘signal following’ space when environments are unpredictable, less when predictable 
(adapted from the flag-model of receiver behavior, McLinn & Stephens 2006). For 
example, when p=0.5, following a perfectly reliable signal (q=1.0) or a mediocre signal 
(say q=0.6) both lead to the correct action more often than acting without the signal 
(because q > p). Alternatively, receivers should only follow extremely reliable signals 
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when environmental certainty is high. Therefore, the certainty of the environment should 
constrain the set of strategies available to signalers, and whether they can use complete 
honesty (i.e., perfect reliability), dishonesty, or something in between (we develop a 
model to explore this idea at length in the appendix).  
In natural signaling problems, certainty refers to receiver’s prior information 
about behaviorally relevant states. If, for example, 90% of males are high quality, then 
female receivers can be relatively confident about the quality of a particular signaling 
male; at the other extreme, if only 50% of males are high quality, then female receivers 
will be relatively uncertain about the quality of a signaling male.  More generally, 
certainty, and its polar opposite uncertainty, reflects the variability in the prior 
distribution of the states that animals ‘signal about,’ whether these states are differences 
in patch richness, male quality, motivation to fight, or hunger. If there are only two 
possible states, as in our experiment, the base rate p is sufficient to describe this 
uncertainty. In more complicated situations with many possible states one could use 
variance or the Shannon index (Shannon, 1948) to measure uncertainty.  
Signalers should use receiver tolerance as an opportunity to influence receivers to 
make decisions that benefit themselves; this means signaling reliably when signaler and 
receiver agree on the best outcome, but decreasing reliability when conflict exists. The 
ability of signalers to flexibly capitalize on receiver tolerance depends on the assumption 
that signalers are sensitive to their influence over receivers. Our first experiment tests this 
assumption by showing the extent to which signalers exploit a unilaterally tolerant 
receiver (i.e., one that always follows signals). We expect signalers to change their 
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signaling strategy in response to this receiver tolerance and opportunistically reduce 
reliability when conflict exists. Second, we test the hypothesis that unpredictable 
environments cause receivers to tolerate imperfectly reliable signals which in turn allows 
signalers to signal dishonestly and exploit this tolerance. We expect the level of 
environmental certainty to modify receiver tolerance, and thus change whether signalers 
can signal dishonestly without causing the receiver to ignore signals.  
This set of two experiments placed pairs of captive blue jays in adjacent operant 
chambers (Fig. 2), where they played a signal-response game. The signaler used 
positional signals to indicate to the receiver which of two perches was rewarded with 
food. Using this design, we explored signaling equilibria achieved by learning in a novel 
laboratory situation. This is an atypical approach because most studies have focused on 
signals in natural contexts, where equilibria are maintained across generations and the 
interaction between genes and experience is typically undefined.  Importantly, though, 
our methodology allows precise control over theoretically important variables. For 
example, we can precisely control environmental certainty by manipulating the 
probability that each of two perches is rewarded with food. We can also manage the 
incentives of signalers and receivers by regulating food rewards; creating conditions of 
mutual benefit or conflict. 
General Methods 
Definitions: honesty and reliability 
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It is rather straightforward to measure the reliability of signalers’ actions (e.g., 
signal A is consistently given in state A). It is less clear whether reliability is the 
equivalent of honesty, or if a lapse in reliability is dishonest (rather than an ‘honest 
mistake’) (Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 2011; Wiley, 1994). As such, we use the following 
definitions to identify signaler actions as honest or dishonest (though other definitions 
exist, we follow Searcy & Nowicki 2005; Polnaszek & Stephens 2014). First, the receiver 
must have a history of responding to signal S with action A. The action of a signaler is 
then honest if it gives signal S when action A is in the best interest of the receiver. The 
same signal, S, is dishonest when action A is in the best interest of the signaler, but not in 
the best interest of the receiver. In the context of our game, an honest signal, when 
considered together with historical receiver responses, allows receivers to reliably 
identify the true state. In our experimental signaling games we know the economic 
payoffs to both players and thus can determine when these definitions are fulfilled. 
Subjects, housing, experimental apparatus 
We randomly selected adult blue jays from our larger colony of jays. The group 
of subjects was of mixed sex, age, and experimental histories. We kept subjects in 
individual operant boxes for 23 h / day throughout the duration of training and the 
experiments. The intervening 1 h provided time for daily health and weight checks, as 
well as the opportunity to clean and sanitize the operant boxes. We maintained the 
subjects on a 12 h light / 12 h dark light-cycle and provided water ad libitum. We tested 
the subjects in a closed economy, meaning all food was earned during the experiment. 
However, we provided supplemental food to any subjects that earned less than 7 grams 
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per day. Some treatments involved interactions where one subject was rewarded at the 
expense of the other, so we set reward amounts that ensured no subject experienced 
periods of food deprivation. We positioned pairs of operant boxes adjacent to one another 
to create a signaling arena (Fig 2). The subjects in adjacent boxes formed a 
signaler/receiver dyad. During the experiment, two transparent partitions between the 
boxes allowed the signaler to indicate to the receiver the perch location that offered a 
food reward by hopping to the corresponding side (either on the right or the left side of 
the box). Perches at the back of each box and on the shared wall at the front recorded the 
presence of the subjects. Each box was equipped with lights to indicate the timing of 
events within the experiment (e.g., when a trial started, when a choice was offered) and 
the signaler had a private light cue that indicated which side the receiver should hop to 
for a reward. 
Experiment 1: The consequences – Do signalers exploit receiver 
tolerance? 
Experiment 1 assessed the signaler’s response to experimental manipulations of 
receiver behavior; receivers followed signals in some treatments and ignored signals in 
others. The experiment tested the hypothesis that signalers strategically adjust signaling 
behavior in response to receiver behavior. This is an important claim, since it allows a 
feedback loop for signaler-receiver interactions. For example, signalers can exploit an 
uncertain environment, and any receiver tolerance it causes, only if they adjust signaling 
in response to changes in receiver behavior.  
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Experiment 1: Methods 
The design of the experiment was a 2 x 2 factorial, where we tested two levels of 
shared incentives between individuals (Aligned or Opposed) and two types of receiver 
strategy (Follow or Ignore signaled information). We controlled the incentives of the 
signaler by creating situations where the signaler is rewarded when the receiver correctly 
matches the true state (termed incentives Aligned) or when the receiver chooses the 
opposite of the true state (incentives Opposed; Table 1). Notice that the signaler’s reward 
solely depended on the action of the receiver in both of these treatments. We controlled 
receiver tolerance by experimentally manipulating receiver responsiveness to signals. To 
control receiver behavior, we trained receivers to exclusively follow experimenter 
provided cues (i.e., lights only visible to the receiver). In the Receiver Follow treatment, 
we directed the receiver to always choose the signaled side. We directed the receiver to 
choose the left or right side randomly (i.e., no correlation to the signaled side) in the 
Receiver Ignore treatment. In this situation we predict that signaler behavior will be 
determined by an interaction between receiver behavior (follow vs. ignore) and the 
underlying economic incentives. Incentives should not affect signaler behavior when the 
receiver ignores the signaler, but when the receiver blindly follows signaler actions we 
expect that signalers will exploit this by matching the true state when incentives are 
aligned and by choosing the opposite of the true state (non-matching) when incentives are 
opposed (Table 2).  
Subjects and overview 
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Eight blue jays of mixed experimental histories served as research subjects. We 
randomly grouped individuals into pairs, and each pair remained together for the duration 
of the experiment. Within each pair, one individual was randomly designated as the 
signaler, and the other as the receiver; they remained in these roles throughout the 
experiment.   
Trials, Blocks and Termination Criteria 
We organized trials into blocks of 72 trials. We did not vary the certainty of the 
environment in this experiment, and left and right were the ‘true’ side for half of the trials 
within a block (in the terminology of our model, we set p=0.5 for the duration of 
experiment 1). We further subdivided each block into groups of 36 trials. Each sub-block 
started with six forced trials followed by 30 free trials. There were 12 forced trial types, 
with every combination of possible signaler and receiver actions (signaler forced to left, 
right, or center perch; receiver left or right) paired with each state (left or right the current 
true state). We randomly assigned the 12 forced trial types to the first or second sub-
block for each block of trials. We also randomly assigned an order for the forced trials 
within each sub-block. All birds experienced each treatment until they completed 800 
free trials, and we used the last 200 free trials to calculate relevant dependent measures. 
Within-trial Procedures 
Free trials 
After an inter-trial interval (ITI) of 120 seconds, white lights at the back of each 
bird’s box indicated the start of a new trial. We required each bird to move to the back 
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perch (away from the shared partition) to begin the trial. A state light illuminated in the 
signaler’s box, indicating whether left or right was the ‘true’ side on a given trial. The 
signaler then could choose to signal (either to the ‘true’ side or not), or choose not to 
signal (using the middle perch, in front of the opaque partition). After the signaler made 
its choice, the computer determined the receiver’s action.  The receiver had been 
previously trained to a light following task, so that in ‘ignore’ treatments the computer 
choose randomly and receiver appeared to ignore the signaler’s actions. In the ‘follow’ 
treatment, the computer switched on the light adjacent to the signaler’s choice so the 
receiver appeared to be following the signaler’s actions. We only activated the perch that 
the computer indicated the receiver to use, such that receivers could only progress 
through the trial if they followed their private light cue. Neither the signaler nor receiver 
were allowed to change their perches after they made their initial choices. To achieve 
this, the computer was programmed to ‘abort a trial’ (meaning no food is delivered) if 
either player changed perches before food was delivered. After a brief period of 
acquisition, the bird quickly learned this contingency and perch switching was very rare.  
When the signaler chose a signaling perch in front of the transparent partitions, its 
payoff depended on which perch the computer program chose for the receiver to use; the 
signaler either received three 20 mg food pellets or zero pellets (Table 1). If the signaler 
chose the center, non-signal perch, it always received one 20 mg food pellet. The receiver 
always obtained two 20 mg pellets for following its computer directed light cue. The free 
trial aborted if the pair did not progress through a trial within 7 minutes. 
Forced trials 
   52 
During forced trials, the signaler was forced in its choice of perch by deactivating 
all other perches. For example, on a forced signaler-left trial only the left perch allowed 
the signaler to proceed through the trial. The pair of birds completed every combination 
of perch choices (signaler – left, right or center; receiver – left or right) in each state (left 
true, right true) per block of trials. If a forced trial was not successfully completed within 
7 min, the trial aborted and the pair faced the same type of forced trial after the ITI. All 
event timing and payoff structures were identical to free trials.  
Dependent measures 
 In this experiment we measured the extent to which the signaler accurately 
matched the true state. A value of 1.0 means that a signaler always matched the true state, 
and a value of 0.0 that a signaler consistently indicated the opposite of the true state. To 
exploit receivers that follow signals, we expect signalers to match the true state when 
incentives align and mismatch the true state when incentives oppose. 
Experiment 1: Results 
Repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant Receiver Strategy x Incentives 
interaction effect on the proportion of state matching by signalers (F1,3=35.049, 
p=.0096). When receivers ignored signals (choosing perches randomly), the signalers 
signaled randomly (Fig 3). In this case, there was no difference in signaler behavior 
regardless of whether incentives were opposed or aligned (Tukey HSD, p = 0.8876). In 
the ‘follow’ treatment, signalers matched the ‘true’ side significantly more often when 
incentives were aligned (Tukey HSD, p = 0.0141). When incentives were opposed in this 
treatment, signals almost always indicated the opposite of the true state. 
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Discussion in Brief 
The results demonstrate that signalers adjusted reliability based on the economic 
payoffs and these two extreme cases of receiver behavior. Specifically, signalers 
decreased state matching when incentives opposed, but they reliably matched the true 
state when incentives aligned. Here, we controlled the level of receiver tolerance by using 
experimentally controlled receivers; receivers either followed all signals (regardless of 
reliability) or acted randomly. We expect that the degree of signal following exhibited by 
freely acting receivers will likely fall between these two extremes of programmed 
behavior in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 tests freely acting signalers and receivers in a 
similar signaling game, demonstrating whether signaling strategy changes based on 
receiver tolerance induced by changes in environmental certainty. 
Experiment 2: The causes – Does uncertainty increase receiver 
tolerance for reduced reliability?  
This experiment tested whether signalers exploit low certainty in the environment 
by decreasing reliability as certainty decreases. Our model (see appendix) predicts that 
low environmental certainty creates ‘exploitable space’ by increasing receiver 
uncertainty. That is, when environments are unpredictable, receivers are uncertain which 
action is best. The model predicts that signalers should capitalize on greater receiver 
uncertainty through dishonest signaling, but only when incentives oppose. When the 
receiver faces a fairly predictable environment, however, there is little opportunity for 
dishonesty. Even when incentives are opposed, environmental certainty helps enforce 
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signal honesty. When incentives align, the signaler should always signal honestly – 
provided the receiver is following signaled information.  
Experiment 2: Methods 
The second experiment used the basic two box signaler-receiver design outlined 
in Experiment 1. During a trial, the signaler viewed a private light cue indicating the 
current state. The signaler then provided a positional signal to the receiver. Instead of 
manipulating receiver responses (as in Experiment 1), the receiver subject responded 
freely to the signal. A freely acting receiver could choose to attend to the positional signal 
or track its environment (i.e., choose the perch which is best on average, a choice 
independent of the signal). We designed Experiment 2 following the general structure of 
the Sir Philip Sidney game (Maynard Smith 1991). In our experimental version of this 
signaling game there are two possible states of the environment, labeled as ‘true’ or 
‘false’. The receiver also has two possible actions, labeled as the ‘accept’ or ‘reject’ 
perch. For each treatment, we randomly designated the perch on either the left or right 
side as the ‘accept’ perch. 
Using a within-subjects factorial design, we manipulated two different treatment 
variables: environmental certainty and shared incentives between signaler and receiver. 
We used food rewards to create treatment conditions of mutual benefit (signaler-receiver 
incentives ‘aligned’) or conditions of conflict (incentives ‘partially opposed’). The 
signaler and receiver always agree on the best receiver action in the aligned treatment, 
but sometimes disagree in the partially opposed treatment. Table 3 describes the payoff 
structures, in food pellets, for each ‘incentives’ treatment and combinations of state and 
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receiver response. We manipulated environmental certainty by controlling the probability 
that the current state was ‘true’ or ‘false’. We tested three levels of environmental 
certainty; p = 0.5, 0.75 and 1.0, where p is the probability that the state was ‘false’. The 
probability of the ‘true’ state was complementary to the probability of the ‘false’ state, 
such that the probability ‘true’ = 1-p. Overall, the design involved six treatment 
combinations which we assigned in a random order to each subject pair.  
Trials, Blocks and Termination Criteria 
We divided trials into blocks of 90 trials. We further split each block into sub-
blocks of 45 trials. Each sub-block started with six forced trials followed by 36 free trials 
and 3 probe trials. We randomly interspersed probe trials between the free trials. During 
free trials, signaler and receiver acted freely, but probe trials consisted of a forced 
signaler action (signal p state, 1-p state, or no signal) paired with a free receiver choice. 
We forced the required signaler action by inactivating all other perches during a probe 
trial. We used probe trials to measure the contingency between signaler action and 
receiver action – in other words, the degree to which receivers followed signals. If 
signalers and receivers both consistently choose only one action during free trials, there is 
no method to determine whether the receiver is using the signal to inform its action. In 
this case, probe trials provide a way to show whether the receiver is actually matching the 
signal or not.  
As with Experiment 1, there were 12 forced trial types, with every combination of 
possible signaler and receiver actions (signaler forced to left, right, or center perch; 
receiver left or right) in each of two states (state ‘true’ or ‘false’). We randomly assigned 
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the 12 forced trial types to the first or second sub-block per each full block of trials. The 
forced trials assigned to a sub-block were completed in a random order. All birds 
experienced each treatment until it completed 1200 free trials, and we used the last 200 
free trials to calculate relevant dependent measures. We also used the data from probe 
trials that fell within the last 200 free trials (delivered at a rate of 3 probe trials per 36 free 
trials). 
Within-trial Procedures 
The within-trial procedures closely matched those of Experiment 1, for both 
forced and free trials (see Within-trial Procedures section from Experiment 1). For a brief 
summary: after an 120 s inter-trial interval, a state light indicates the current state of the 
environment to the signaler, the signaler chooses an action and the receiver responds. As 
with Experiment 1, after the signaler chose a position, it could not change its choice or 
the trial aborted. The economic payoff, in pellets, for each player depends on the current 
state, receiver action, and the level of shared incentives (aligned or partially opposed). 
Table 3 shows the food pellet payoffs for each combination of these variables. One key 
difference from the Experiment 1, as indicated above, is that we allowed the receiver 
freedom to choose a response to the signal.  
Dependent Measures 
In order to measure honesty, we first calculated the consistency with which the 
signaler’s perch choice matched the true state, p(match state). Then we converted this to 
an overall honesty measure by subtracting 0.5, taking the absolute value, and adding 0.5 
to the result (honesty (q)  = |p(match state) – 0.5)| + 0.5). An absolute value is necessary 
   57 
because, unlike Experiment 1, there were two possible signaling conventions that depend 
on the historical responses of receivers. If the receiver typically matched the signaler’s 
position, an honest signal would be hopping to the rewarded side (receiver matches, earns 
a reward). If the receiver typically chose the opposite perch, the signaler could send an 
honest ‘do not visit this side’ signal. In this second case, honest signaler behavior results 
in a proportion match of 0.0. Our methods did not allow us to exclude either of these 
signaling conventions and subjects used both (that is, some receivers consistently 
matched the signaler’s position and others consistently avoided it). The measure we used 
allowed for either convention subject pairs used, essentially measuring the distance from 
random (p(match state) = 0.5). Adding 0.5 simply changes the range of possible q values; 
from 0.0 ≤ q ≤ 0.5 to a more intuitive 0.5 ≤ q ≤ 1.0, where 0.5 is random and 1.0 is 
perfectly honest.  
We also documented whether or not the receiver followed the signals given. We 
assessed signal following using probe trial data because we can measure receiver 
response to all possible signals. Specifically, we calculated the consistency with which 
the receiver’s choice matched the positional signal (designated as p(match signal)). We 
converted this to an overall signal following measure using the same method as signal 
reliability (p(signal follow)  = |p(match signal) – 0.5)| + 0.5). As with the honesty 
measure, this allowed for either signaling convention; the receiver could ‘follow’ the 
signal by consistently matching or avoiding the position of the signaler. The signal 
following measure ranges from 0.5 to 1.0, where values of 1.0 indicate the receiver either 
consistently matched or consistently avoided the signaler’s position. There were no 
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qualitative differences in examining receiver following behavior with data from probe or 
free trials. Further, the receiver-following measures from free trials and probe trials were 
significantly correlated (r
2
=0.407, F 1,46 = 31.524, p < 0.005), so herein we present the 
data from probe trials only.  
Experiment 2: Results 
Signaler Strategy - Results 
Repeated Measures ANOVA reveals three significant effects on signaler honesty 
(q). First, there is a significant incentives x certainty interaction (F2,14=3.756, p=.049). 
There are also significant main effects of incentives (F1,7=17.162, p=.004) and certainty 
(F2,14=11.265, p=.001) on signaler strategy. Overall, signalers signaled less honestly 
when incentives were opposed. The largest difference in signaler honesty between the 
two incentives treatments occurred when the environment was unpredictable (i.e., p = 
0.5, Fig. 4). When p = 1.0 the environment was completely predictable and there was no 
qualitative difference in signaler honesty.  
Signaler Strategy – Discussion in brief 
 First, higher certainty in the environment influenced signalers to be more honest. 
In other words, the data show that when receivers are more certain of the best action it 
helps prevent dishonesty even when there is an economic imperative for the signaler to 
cheat. Second, signalers showed high levels of fixity in perch choice (e.g. always choose 
left) in the completely predictable environment. However, based on probe and free trial 
data, receivers chose independently of signaler action in these treatments – even though 
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signalers were, by definition, reliably honest. Here, receivers are sure of the best action 
without using the signal. Finally, low levels of environmental certainty cause receivers to 
tolerate imperfectly reliable signals. Signalers exploit this by dramatically decreasing 
honesty when incentives oppose. To demonstrate receiver tolerance, and that this 
dishonesty is successful (that is, receivers still follow signals), we next examine receiver 
behavior. 
Receiver Strategy - Results 
Repeated Measures ANOVA showed a significant effect of environmental 
certainty (p) on signal following (F2,14=10.140, p=.0019). Signal following decreased as 
certainty in the environment increased (Figure 5). We found no significant direct effect of 
incentives, or interaction effect between certainty and incentives.  
Receiver strategy – Discussion in Brief  
The results show that uncertainty in the environment is a key factor in 
determining signal use. Unpredictable environments generated receiver tolerance and 
increased signal following. Literature on receiver signal use often focuses on signal 
reliability but not environmental uncertainty (McLinn & Stephens 2010). Our results also 
demonstrate that the importance of reliability depends on the context of environmental 
uncertainty. In the most unpredictable environment (when p=0.5), receivers followed 
signals equivalently in both ‘incentives’ treatments. Even though signalers signaled less 
reliably in the incentives opposed case, receivers still followed at relatively high rates. 
This is not unexpected because an average ‘signal-following’ receiver earned 13.3 
percent more food per day in this condition than a ‘signal-ignoring’ receiver.  
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Discussion  
The experiments here consider the determinants of receiver tolerance for imperfect 
reliability, and the results demonstrate the value of this alternative perspective to the 
study of signaler-receiver interactions. We tested how signalers respond to receiver 
tolerance and what role environmental certainty plays in shaping signaler and receiver 
strategy. The results show that signalers capitalize on receiver tolerance by signaling 
honestly when their incentives align with receivers, and dishonestly when incentives do 
not align. We know signalers change signaling behavior in response to cues from 
receivers (e.g., Patricelli, Uy, Walsh, & Borgia, 2002; Rodríguez, Haen, Cocroft, & 
Fowler-Finn, 2012; Sullivan-Beckers & Hebets, 2011) so it is unsurprising that they are 
sensitive to their level of influence over receivers (i.e., the degree of receiver signal-
following). Our results in the second experiment show that unpredictable environments 
promote receiver tolerance for imperfect reliability. Receivers increased signal-following 
and followed less honest signals in response to uncertainty about how to act. When the 
incentives between individuals conflicted, signalers exploited the receiver tolerance 
caused by an unpredictable environment.  
Results in context 
Environmental certainty and receiver uncertainty in context 
A key result here is that environmental certainty determines how reliable signalers 
must be to influence receiver behavior. This is a significant claim since models of honest 
signaling often ignore environmental certainty; for example, in the original form of the 
Sir Philip Sidney game (Maynard Smith 1991). The implied unimportance of certainty is 
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surprising, because the idea that environmental certainty influences receiver tolerance for 
imperfect reliability is straightforward and intuitive. If high quality males are common, 
receivers should be more likely to accept the lie “I am a high quality male” then if high 
and low quality males are equally common. Clearly, the theoretical importance of base 
rate to honesty is compelling and broadly applicable. This idea applies with equal force to 
dishonesty about food reward, mate quality, fighting motivation, or prey profitability.  
Our results also illustrate that receiver tolerance induced by environmental 
uncertainty can potentially stabilize communication, even with frequently dishonest 
signals. When environments were unpredictable, receivers were more likely to continue 
paying attention to partially reliable or dishonest signals. This is an important point, since 
it highlights the interaction between signal reliability and receiver tolerance. Signals need 
not always be honest; sometimes it pays receivers to heed unreliable signals. Johnstone 
and Grafen (1993) also argued that signals do not need be perfectly honest, but rather 
“honest on average” for communication to be stable. Our view is similar to this ‘honest 
on average’ argument, but here we reinterpret this statement as signals need to be 
‘sufficiently honest’, such that q > p, for receivers to benefit from following signals. 
Rather than a fixed target, the ‘sufficient’ level of honesty changes with environmental 
certainty. The signaling system may ultimately fail if signals consistently fall short of this 
minimum level. The achieved level of honesty could result from different frequencies of 
certain types of signalers (as in Johnstone & Grafen 1993) or individual signalers playing 
a mixed strategy (see Huttegger & Zollman, 2010; Zollman et al., 2013 for more on the 
importance of mixed strategies).  In the experiment described here, the q > p condition 
   62 
applies over the short time scales of learned responses (see McLinn & Stephens 2006, 
2010 for a related experimental result), interestingly we also have evidence from 
experimental evolution that this condition applies at evolutionary time scales (Dunlap & 
Stephens 2009). 
Receiver tolerance in context 
 Focusing on receiver tolerance for imperfect reliability complements research on 
signal reliability. The basic question of a receiver tolerance-centered research program is 
why receivers follow signals despite imperfect reliability. Two different approaches offer 
potential answers to this question. The first focuses on biases that may compel receiver 
tolerance. Literature on receiver psychology (see Guilford & Dawkins, 1991; Rowe, 2013 
for an overview) emphasizes how the perceptual and cognitive attributes of receivers 
shape their responses to signals. These attributes can constrain or predispose receivers to 
following signals (sensory bias - Basolo, 1990; Ryan et al., 1990), potentially rendering 
them insensitive to changes in reliability. Experiment 1 provides a rough sketch of this 
phenomenon, since receivers were experimentally controlled to slavishly follow signals. 
A second approach is that of ‘receiver economics’ (Mc inn & Stephens 2010), which 
focuses on the economics of signal following to show when it pays to tolerate unreliable 
signals. The relationship between receiver tolerance and environmental certainty outlined 
here is closely aligned with approaches using statistical decision theory (Dall et al., 2005; 
Stephens, 1989; Wiley, 1994), the economics of communication (Bradbury & 
Vehrencamp 2000), and strategies for managing uncertainty and risk (Dall, 2010). We 
show that unpredictable environments create conditions where it benefits receivers to 
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follow signals even though they make mistakes when the signal is dishonest. Our results 
demonstrate that signalers exploit receiver tolerance, whether it is generated by 
constraints on receiver responses (Experiment 1) or by uncertainty in the environment 
(Experiment 2). Thus, although these approaches initially focus on the decisions of the 
receiver, our results highlight the interplay between the problem of receiver tolerance and 
that of signal reliability. 
Limitations and further questions 
Our experimental approach may cause unease for some readers, as the laboratory 
based signaler-receiver interactions seem far removed from natural signaling systems. 
The signaler and receiver behaviors involved here are artificial, but we remark that the 
experimental signaling game does capture the essential pieces of signaling (a state of 
interest, a signaling action and a response action – see Bradbury & Vehrencamp 2011). 
Moreover, this experimental signaling game allows direct control over critical variables 
which are otherwise hard to manipulate – i.e., environmental certainty and the economic 
payoffs to each of the players. We do not offer this approach as a replacement to studying 
animal communication in other contexts, but rather as a tool to complement these studies. 
Animal signaling is a diverse topic, such that no approach is sufficient by itself. 
A critic may also point out that animal signaling research often focuses on traits 
or strategies that are subject to selection on an evolutionary timescale, yet here we study 
signaler and receiver strategies based on learned behavior. Differences between these two 
cases may offer an interesting contrast to study, but there is no reason to exclude learned 
behavior from discussions on animal signaling. In general, we know learning and 
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experience play large roles in signaler-receiver interactions (sexual imprinting, mate-
choice copying, song development, etc.). Moreover, behavioral equilibria determined by 
learning are as acceptable theoretically as those determined by genetics (see Maynard 
Smith 1982). We expect that receiver tolerance can relax selection on honesty through 
various mechanisms and on different timescales; our study of learned signaling is but one 
example.  Our signaling games, especially in concert with more traditional approaches, 
should lead to new insights on the important themes of environment certainty, receiver 
tolerance for imperfect reliability, and signaler exploitation of this receiver tolerance. 
Conclusions 
Our approach, which emphasizes receiver tolerance for imperfect reliability, is an 
important counterpart to the more common perspective which emphasizes signal 
reliability. We suggest signaler reliability and receiver tolerance as equals in importance 
to biologists interested in either signaler or receiver behavior because the two topics are 
interrelated. For example, forces that promote either signaler reliability or receiver 
tolerance can stabilize signaler-receiver interactions, despite conflict of interest between 
individuals. Though we have focused on the behavior of receivers, it is also clear that 
their sensitivity (or lack thereof) to reduced reliability has important implications for 
signaler strategy and the stability of signaler-receiver interactions. 
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Receiver chooses 
‘accept’ perch 
Receiver chooses 
‘reject’ perch 
State = True 
α: 3 pellets 
ω: 0 pellets 
α: 0 pellets 
ω: 3 pellets 
State = False 
α: 0 pellets 
ω: 3 pellets 
α: 3 pellets 
ω: 0 pellets 
 
Table 2.1: Payoff for the signaler for the two incentives treatments (α = aligned, ω = 
opposed). In the aligned treatment, signalers are rewarded when receivers match their 
action to the current state (accepting when true, rejecting when false). Signalers are 
rewarded when receivers mismatch action and state in the incentives opposed treatment. 
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 Receiver Follows Receiver Ignores 
Incentives 
Aligned 
Always match 
state (q=1.0) 
Random signaling 
(q=0.5) 
Incentives 
Opposed 
Always mismatch 
state (q=0.0) 
Random signaling 
(q=0.5) 
 
Table 2.2: Predicted signaler behavior for each level of ‘Incentives’ and ‘Receiver 
strategy’. When receivers ignore, signalers cannot influence receiver behavior, and 
should signal randomly. If receivers follow, reliability should depend on the incentives – 
either extreme state matching or state mismatching.  
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Receiver chooses 
‘accept’ perch 
Receiver chooses 
‘reject’ perch 
State = True 
α: 4 pellets 
ω: 4 pellets 
α: 0 pellets 
ω: 0 pellets 
State = False 
α: 1 pellets 
ω: 4 pellets 
α: 4 pellets 
ω: 1 pellets 
 
Table 2.3: Payoff for the signaler in the two incentives treatments (α = aligned, ω = 
opposed). Signalers always prefer receivers to choose the ‘accept’ perch in the opposed 
treatment. In the aligned treatment, signalers and receivers benefit when receiver actions 
correctly match the state (accept when true, reject when false). 
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Figure 2.1:  Environmental certainty is on the x-axis, signal reliability on the y-axis. 
Receivers should only follow signals when q > p. There is more signal-following space 
(indicated by the white area) in uncertain environments (when p is near 0.5). Almost no 
signal-following space exists in certain environments (when p is near 1.0). 
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Figure 2.2: Overhead view of apparatus. Signaler provides positional cues by visiting the 
perches in front of transparent partitions (left and right), or can ‘opt out’ of signaling by 
visiting its middle front perch. After signaler action, receivers hop from their rear perch 
to one of two front perches. 
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Figure 2.3: Relative frequency of state matching (Mean ± SE) for different levels of 
incentives (x-axis) and receiver strategy. Solid line shows signaling behavior when 
receivers ignored signals (choice determined randomly by computer), the dashed line 
represents when receivers followed signals –that is, they matched signaler position.  
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Figure 2.4: Observed signaler honesty for Experiment 2 (Mean ± SE). Level of 
environmental certainty is on the x-axis, and signal reliability on the y-axis. Solid line 
indicates reliability when incentives were opposed, and the dashed line when incentives 
aligned. Notice that the data points from the aligned and opposed treatments are slightly 
offset horizontally to facilitate visual comparisons. 
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Figure 2.5: Frequency of receiver following (probe trials, Mean ± SE) for different levels 
of incentives (Aligned or Opposed) and levels of environmental certainty (p, on the x-
axis). Solid line indicates signal following when incentives were opposed, and the dashed 
line when incentives aligned. Notice that the data points from the aligned and opposed 
treatments are slightly offset horizontally to facilitate visual comparisons.
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Chapter 3: Why not lie? Costs enforce honesty in an 
experimental signaling game3 
Abstract 
Communication depends on reliability. Yet, the existence of stable honest 
signaling presents an evolutionary puzzle. Why should animals signal honestly in the face 
of a conflict of interest? While students of animal signaling have offered several 
theoretical answers to this puzzle, the mostly widely studied model, commonly called the 
‘handicap principle’, postulates that the costs of signals stabilize honesty. This model is 
the motivating force behind an enormous research enterprise that explores signal costs – 
whether they are physiological, immunological, neural, developmental or caloric. While 
there can be no question that many signals are costly, we lack definitive experimental 
evidence demonstrating that costs stabilize honesty. This study presents a laboratory 
signaling game using blue jays (Cyanocitta cristata) that provides the first experimental 
evidence showing honesty persists when costs are high, and disappears when costs are 
low. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 This chapter is published as: Polnaszek, T. J. & Stephens, D.W. (2014) Why not lie? Costs enforce 
honesty in an experimental signaling game. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 
281(1774). 
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Introduction 
Honesty and the Handicap principle 
Why are signalers honest even though lying often produces higher benefits? The 
problem of honest (and dishonest) communication is important for many disciplines. In 
economics, for example, understanding the conditions in which we can expect agents to 
exchange honest information represents a fundamental problem in the analysis of markets 
(e.g., Spence, 1973). One could, moreover, make similar statements about nearly any 
field in the social and behavioral sciences including anthropology, behavioral ecology, 
cognitive science, linguistics, political science, psychology, sociology, and others. 
Although other models of honest signaling exist (reviewed in Számadó, 2011), Zahavi’s 
handicap principle (A. Zahavi, 1975; A Zahavi, 1977) holds a central position in 
explaining the evolution of honest signaling. Handicap signals are generally defined as 
signals whose reliability “is maintained by signal production costs” (Bradbury & 
Vehrencamp, 2011). The handicap principle’s focus on signal costs has produced a 
diverse and energetic research program that explores the mechanisms and nature of signal 
costs. This research program has considered many forms of signaling (e.g., mate choice 
(Rufus A. Johnstone, 1995), predator deterrence (Vega-Redondo & Hasson, 1993), and 
even the practice of religion (Bird & Smith, 2005), and many ways in which signals can 
be costly including the developmental costs of pigments (Huggins, Navara, Mendonça, & 
Hill, 2010), oxidative stress (Noguera, Morales, Pérez, & Velando, 2010), reduced 
immunocompetence (Moreno-Rueda, 2010), and heightened risk of predation (Ibáñez-
Álamo, Arco, & Soler, 2012).  
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History & Criticisms 
Notwithstanding the enormous efforts devoted to the study of signal costs, the 
absence of definitive experimental evidence of the role of costs in stabilizing honesty has 
made this an increasingly contentious research program (see Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 
2011; Maynard Smith & Harper, 2003; Searcy & Nowicki, 2005 for detailed historical 
overviews). Critics of the handicap principle have questioned the basic approach, often 
emphasizing the value of alternative ways to maintain honesty (summarized in (Számadó, 
2011)). Some authors advance the claim that studies of costly signaling have simply 
measured the wrong costs (Getty, 2006; Grose, 2011; Lachmann et al., 2001). Other 
critics even question the value of demonstrating that signals have costs (see (Grose, 2011; 
Számadó, 2011)), since the mere existence of signal costs is necessary but far from 
sufficient to substantiate their role in the maintenance of honesty (Lachmann et al., 2001). 
Overall, critics offer a varied list of complaints about the literature on signal cost and 
cumulatively they underscore the urgency of the need for innovative and rigorous new 
approaches to test the claims of handicap models (Kotiaho, 2001; Moreno-Rueda, 2007; 
Roberts, Buchanan, & Evans, 2004) – models whose current influence clearly outweighs 
their own empirical support (Enquist et al., 2010; Grose, 2011; Rufus A. Johnstone, 
1997). 
In the face of these critiques, direct experimental evidence on the role of costs in 
maintaining honesty seems critically important. Evidence demonstrating the link between 
cost and honesty would narrow the gap between theory and empirical research. Yet, this 
represents a challenging experimental problem for at least two reasons. First, it is difficult 
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to meaningfully manipulate the costs of natural signals like colorful tails or stridulation. 
Second, it can be difficult to characterize natural signals as honest or dishonest because 
we are seldom certain of the underlying states that animals signal about (Kokko, Brooks, 
Jennions, & Morley, 2003; Lotem, 1993).  
This paper presents a direct experimental test of the role of costs in stabilizing 
honesty using a laboratory simulation of signaling that solves these problems. As a first 
step, we develop a simple model of ‘handicap signaling.’ Here we consider ‘handicaps’ 
in the general sense, where a handicap is any signal whose reliability is ensured by costs 
that exceed the minimal costs necessary to make the signal (Maynard Smith & Harper, 
2003). Our model is a variant of Maynard Smith’s Sir Philip Sidney game (Maynard 
Smith, 1991), modified to suit our experimental situation.  
Model and predictions 
We imagine that some aspect of the environment exists in two possible states that 
we call “true” and “false.” We assume that the state is true with probability p, and we 
restrict our attention to the case where 0.5 ≤ p < 1. For any given play of this game, the 
signaler knows the state but the receiver does not. The receiver must choose between two 
alternative actions that we call “accept” and “reject.” The receiver does best by matching 
its action to the state of the environment; specifically, ‘accepting’ is best when the state is 
true and ‘rejecting’ is best when the state is false (Table 1A). Table 1B shows how the 
receiver’s actions interact with the state to determine the signaler’s benefits: when the 
state is true, the accept action is in the best interest of both players. There can be a 
conflict of interest, however, if the state is false. The receiver always benefits from reject-
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ing a false state, but the signaler’s best interests are determined by the parameters a and 
b. If b > a, we have a mutualism where the signaler’s and receiver’s incentives are 
aligned; if, however, b < a we have a case where the incentives of the two individuals are 
opposed (such that the signaler benefits if the receiver ‘accepts,’ but rejecting is best for 
the receiver). Finally, we imagine that the signaler can choose between two actions that 
we call “signal”--meaning indicate the true state--and “no signal” (which indicates the 
false state). Note that while the terms used here are convenient, formally these are 
arbitrary labels for three general types of entities: states (here: true vs. false); receiver 
actions, (here: accept vs. reject); and possible signals, (here: signal vs. no). Table 1C 
shows the costs paid by the signaler to emit these two signal types. For simplicity, we 
assume cost is independent of environmental state. Table 2 shows a simple game matrix 
derived from these assumptions. We consider two signaler strategies. An honest strategist 
signals when the state is true and gives no signal when the state is false. A dishonest 
strategist signals in both true and false states. We also consider two receiver strategies. A 
follow strategist accepts when a signal is observed, and rejects when no signal is 
observed. An ignore strategist ignores the signal and adopts the strategy that is best on 
average, which is to always accept because p ≥ 0.5. To determine stability of the 
Honest/Follow equilibrium, we compare the signaler’s payoff in the Honest/Follow cell 
(upper left) to the signaler’s payoff in the Dishonest/Follow cell (upper right), and we 
find that stability requires c > a-b. The handicap principle emerges here because honest 
signaling can only be stable when the cost of dishonestly signaling true (c) exceeds the 
difference a-b, which measures the conflict of interest between signaler and receiver. In 
   78 
this case, we can infer the effect of signal cost on honesty directly from the game matrix; 
we can also derive this condition by applying Grafen’s authoritative cost condition 
(Grafen, 1990, p. 519-520). Following Grafen, our model assumes that costs and benefits 
accumulate additively; while multiplicative costs and benefits are important for some 
applications of the handicap principle (Getty, 2006), additive combinations are 
appropriate for our experimental situation. In general, we expect honesty whenever the 
costs exceed the benefits of dishonesty, and in our model these are parameterized by c 
and the difference a-b respectively.  
Experimental approach 
We developed a laboratory signaling game that gave us direct control over the 
theoretically significant variables of our model. Using this approach, we tested our model 
in a factorial experiment which used four levels of signal cost and two distinct payoff 
structures: incentives aligned, in which signaler and receiver share a common payoff 
structure, and incentives opposed, in which the signaler sometimes benefits when the 
receiver acts against its own best interests (Table 1). Our model predicts that signalers 
will signal honestly in the incentives aligned condition regardless of cost, but that 
signalers will only signal honestly when costs are high in the incentives opposed 
condition. 
 Our approach is unconventional in at least two respects. While our discussion will 
address these issues in detail, they merit some mention here because they represent a 
fairly drastic departure from typical studies of handicap signaling. First, we have studied 
the role of costs in the maintenance of honesty in a game involving food reward rather 
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than mate selection. While the handicap principle is most widely applied to sexual 
signaling, the effects of cost are clearly applicable to honesty in a much broader sense as 
both Grafen (1990) and Zahavi (1977) pointed out. Second, the game theoretical 
equilibria studied here are established and maintained by learning rather than fixed 
genetics. While we cannot know the extent to which our findings apply to other 
situations, our approach, with its dependence on learning, gives us access to variables that 
are very difficult to manipulate and even measure in other situations.  
Methods 
Procedural overview. We tested our model using a procedure in which pairs of 
blue jays (Cyanocitta cristata) assumed the roles of signaler and receiver in an 
experimental game played for food rewards (see Figure 1 for apparatus and within-trial 
details). The basic components of our signaling game, as in the model above, are: (i) two 
possible states of the ‘environment’ (designated “true” and “false”), (ii) two signal states 
(“signal” or “no signal”), and (iii) two possible receiver responses (“accept” or “reject”). 
To create the experimental incentive structures (aligned or opposed), we manipulated the 
payoffs (in food pellets) associated with each outcome of the game. We also directly 
controlled the level of cost, paid in ‘shuttle flights’ before the signaler can access the 
signaling option. Finally, we note that the game allows a clear operational definition of 
honesty (see below), because we can observe situations in which the signaler indicates an 
action that is not in the receiver’s best interest.  
Subjects, housing and experimental apparatus 
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 We randomly selected 14 adult blue jays from our colony of individuals. All 
subjects had previous experience in other experimental signaling games. To minimize 
effects from previous experience, we grouped subjects into random pairs and randomly 
assigned roles (as signaler or receiver). During the experiment, we kept each member of 
the pair in separate but adjacent Skinner boxes. A transparent partition allowed signalers 
and receivers to interact, such that the signaler could provide a positional signal by 
hopping in front of the partition (Figure 1). We kept subjects in their Skinner boxes for 
23 h / day. The one hour provided time for daily sanitation of boxes, as well as health and 
weight checks. We kept subjects on a 12 h light / 12 h dark light cycle and provided 
water ad libitum. The experiment maintained signalers and receivers on a closed 
economy, where each individual earned all its food from playing the signaling game, with 
a few exceptions. If an individual earned less than 6 g per day, we provided food up to 
this minimum amount. In addition, we closely monitored the overall health of the 
subjects, providing appropriate veterinary care as required.  
Treatments, trials, and blocks 
 Table 1 shows the economic consequences associated with all possible 
combinations of signaler and receiver behavior. Our experimental conditions were 
factorial combinations of the four levels of signal cost (c in Table 1C; 0, 1, 4, or 7 shuttle 
flights required to ‘signal’), and two arrangements of incentives (incentives aligned and 
incentives opposed). These arrangements correspond to values of the variables a and b in 
Table 1B. In our incentives aligned condition a=0.33 (1 food pellet) and b=1.0 (3 food 
pellets), while in our incentives opposed a=1.0 and b=0.33.Whereas we cannot 
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quantitatively predict the value of shuttle flights in terms of food pellets, these 
experimental conditions allowed us to qualitatively test our model and document the 
effects of increasing signal costs. 
 We presented forced (i.e., no-choice) and free trials in blocks of 36 trials. Each 
block started with 4 forced trials, followed by 32 free trials. We scheduled 8 types of 
forced trials, accounting for each permutation of state, signaler action and receiver 
response. Since only 4 types of forced trials were sampled per block, we restricted 
randomization of the appearance of forced trials such that each type occurred once within 
a set of two blocks of trials. We completely randomized the order of each set of 8 forced 
trials. We also randomized the current state for each free trial, but restricted such that 16 
true and 16 false trials occurred per block. 
Within-trial procedures 
Free trials 
 An inter-trial interval (ITI) of 120 s preceded every free trial. After the ITI 
expired, a light illuminated at the rear of the signaler’s box. The signaler moved to the 
rear perch, away from the shared partition, in order to begin a new trial. One of two red 
state lights illuminated, indicating the state for the given trial as either true or false. The 
signaler then could choose to either hop to the ‘no signal’ perch (on one side, in front of 
an opaque partition) or pay the cost of signaling. Note, when the cost of signaling was 
zero, the signaler could immediately choose between the ‘no signal’ perch and the 
‘signal’ perch (in front of the transparent window into the receiver’s box). If signaling 
was costly, the signaler indicated its choice to pay the cost of signaling by hopping to the 
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cost perch. The trial aborted if the signaler used the signaling perch before paying signal 
costs. Therefore, to activate the signaling perch, the signaler needed to complete c shuttle 
flights between the cost perch and the rear perch, (where c = 0, 1, 4 or 7, depending on 
the current treatment). Each shuttle flight consisted of one circuit between the cost perch 
and the rear perch. After completing the shuttle flights, an orange LED indicated the 
signaler could access the signaling perch. Once the signaler either 1) completed paying 
the signal cost or 2) chose the ‘no signal’ perch, a light illuminated at the rear of the 
receiver’s box. The receiver then proceeded to the back of the box (away from the 
signaler and its box) if not already at its rear perch station. Once at the rear perch, orange 
LEDs above each response perch illuminated and the receiver was free to choose either 
the ‘accept’ perch (in front of the window) or the ‘reject’ perch (in front of the opaque 
partition). After signaler action and receiver response, both individuals received food 
pellet rewards, the amount determined by the current treatment, the ‘state of the 
environment’ on given trial (true or false), and the receiver response. We manipulated the 
shared incentives between subjects by changing the pellet payoff for combinations of 
state and receiver response as shown in Table 1. The free trial aborted if the pair did not 
complete it within 7 minutes, and the pair repeated the same type of free trial after an ITI 
of 120 s. 
Forced trials 
Forced trials proceeded similar to free trials, except signalers and receivers were 
forced into particular actions and responses. Two possible states (true or false), two 
signaler actions (signal or no), and two receiver responses (accept or reject) create 8 
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possible combinations. In order to force a particular action or response, only the required 
perch was activated (e.g., on a forced accept trial, only hopping onto the accept perch 
allowed the receiver to progress through the trial). If a forced trial was not completed 
within 7 minutes, the trial aborted and the subject pair restarted the same type of forced 
trial. This ensured all subjects experienced each combination of events at least once every 
72 trials. Otherwise, the payoffs and timing of events within forced trials were identical 
to free trials. 
Termination criteria 
Our experiment tested the stability of honest signals. The rationale for this is that 
game theoretical models predict the stability, but not necessarily the development of 
equilibrium states. To achieve these stability tests, we preceded each test condition (that 
is, each cost by incentive structure combination) with a mutualism treatment (similar to 
our incentives aligned treatment, such that signaler and receiver both obtained food only 
for correct receiver responses). All birds experienced this pre-treatment condition until 
subjects completed at least 300 trials and reached a signaling / signal-following 
equilibrium. We used a signaling criterion of >0.80 reliability of signaler action (i.e., 
‘signal’ when state is true and ‘no signal’ when false). For signal following, the receiver 
response needed to match signaler action at a frequency of >0.80. We assessed these 
criteria at the end of each experiment day, requiring both values for either 1) the entire 
day or 2) the last 3 blocks of trials (96 free trials total) to exceed the critical value of 0.80. 
After signalers were consistently honest (matching signal state to environmental state) 
and receivers were consistently following the signaler’s action in this mutualism pre-
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treatment, we changed the parameters of the signaling game to test the stability of 
communication in one of the treatment conditions specified in our factorial design. All 
subject pairs experienced the full set of treatments in a randomized order. Each pair of 
subjects experienced experimental treatment parameters for 900 free trials, and we used 
the final 300 in each treatment condition for our statistical analysis. In the results to 
follow, we first consider the observed behavior of signalers, and then the behavior of 
receivers. 
While we have already defined the honest and dishonest strategists within the 
context our model and experimental game, we need to recognize specific actions as either 
honest or dishonest to analyze our data. We adopt, therefore, the following operational 
definition of honest and dishonest signals.  Our definition has two components. First, the 
receiver must have a history of responding to signal S with action A. If this condition is 
satisfied, we say that the signaler is acting dishonestly if it emits S when action A is in the 
best interests of the signaler but not in the best interests of the receiver. Similarly, we say 
that the signaler is acting honestly if it emits S when action A is the best interests of the 
receiver but not in the best interests of the signaler. Notice that this definition can be 
applied directly and objectively within our experiment. Our mutualism pre-treatment 
establishes the history of receiver responses, and we recognize economic conflicts of 
interest because we have control of the payoff structure of the game.  
Results 
Signaler behavior  
   85 
 Figure 2a illustrates the significant interaction of cost and incentive structure on 
signaler honesty (Repeated measures ANOVA, F3,18=14.022, p=.00006). We observe 
close to zero dishonesty in the incentives aligned treatment. Moreover, changing the cost 
of signals has virtually no effect of the frequency of dishonest signals when incentives are 
aligned. The data tell a different story, however, when incentives are opposed. When the 
costs of signaling are low, signalers are commonly dishonest in the sense that they signal 
an action that is not in the receiver’s best interest. When the costs of signaling increase, 
we observe a dramatic decrease in the frequency of these dishonest signals. 
Receiver behavior  
 Of course, we also predict that the receiver’s behavior should be sensitive to the 
reliability of the signaler’s signals. Receivers respond to the behavior of signalers as we 
expect, that is they follow signals more closely when they are reliable (Figure 2b; 
Repeated measures ANOVA, F3,18=4.9113, p=.0115). Specifically, receivers 
dramatically decreased their signal-following behavior in our ‘no cost’ treatment where 
signalers often signaled unreliably.  
Discussion 
Significance of results 
Models of handicap signaling (Grafen, 1990; A. Zahavi, 1975) hypothesize that 
signal costs stabilize honesty. Following accepted standards of scientific inference, 
experimental manipulation of costs should provide the strongest possible evidence that 
costs do, indeed, stabilize honest signaling. Our results provide the first experimental 
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evidence of this type. Specifically, our experiment shows that in the presence of an 
incentive to cheat, subjects signaled honestly when costs were high but signaled 
dishonestly when costs were low; providing direct experimental support for the handicap 
principle’s most basic causal hypothesis. Yet, our result also illustrates a simple but 
important limitation of the typical approach to studying handicaps, because costs did not 
affect signal honesty when signaler and receiver incentives were mutualistically aligned. 
Models of signaling have been clear about the unimportance of signal cost in mutualisms 
(e.g., Maynard Smith, 1991), but empirical studies of signal costs often proceed without 
first confirming that a conflict of interest exists. 
In the shorthand of the signaling literature, investigators commonly emphasize the 
importance of differential costs or state dependent costs in the control of honesty. A 
reader with this terminology in mind may feel that the cost structure shown in Table 1C 
does not satisfy the requirements for handicap signaling, because the costs are the same 
in both the true and false states.  It is more accurate to say, however, that handicap 
signaling requires ‘differential marginal’ costs, because this phrase captures the 
comparison of differences implicit in Grafen’s cost condition. In our situation, this 
comparison of differences requires that the difference in payoff between the honest and 
dishonest strategists in the bad state (the cost of the dishonest strategy in the bad state) 
must be greater than the same difference in the good state (the cost of the dishonesty 
strategy in the good state). Recall, however, that a dishonest strategist signals correctly in 
the good state (because to do otherwise would be against the dishonest individual’s best 
interests). This means that the dishonest and honest strategists behave the same way in 
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the good state, so the difference in their expected payoffs (and hence the state-dependent 
cost of the dishonest strategy) is zero. The difference in marginal costs required by the 
handicap principle, therefore, depends on whether the ‘cost of dishonesty in the bad state’ 
is greater than zero, which is true when c > a-b (which we can also directly observe from 
the game matrix, Table 2). 
The approach adopted here is different, even radically different, from the 
traditions of ‘costly signaling’ research. While we will discuss the possible weaknesses of 
our approach in the following paragraphs, we remark that our approach also has many 
advantages. It allows the manipulation of many theoretically important variables and it 
lends itself to straightforward operational definitions of honesty and dishonesty. Overall, 
we argue that it offers a valuable new tool in the study of signaling games.  
Results in context 
Models of handicap signaling have motivated the publication of many studies of 
signal cost. These papers are diverse and ingenious. They include, for example, efforts to 
characterize the energetic and predation costs of begging (reviewed in Moreno-Rueda, 
2007); and sophisticated studies emphasizing the developmental costs and signal value of 
carotenoid pigments (Fitze, Tschirren, Gasparini, & Richner, 2007; Hill, 1991; McGraw 
et al., 2005). There can be no doubt that signals have costs that take many forms (e.g. 
production costs, developmental costs, receiver-imposed costs) and arise via a wide range 
of mechanisms (increased predation risk, energetic, immunological, genetic etc.). Yet, we 
have a growing list of reviews that express their dissatisfaction with the signal cost 
literature (Grose, 2011; Kilner & Johnstone, 1997; Kotiaho, 2001; Moreno-Rueda, 2007; 
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Roberts et al., 2004; Searcy & Nowicki, 2005; Számadó, 2011). The litany of complaints 
includes: (i) the simple existence of signal costs tells us little about signal honesty; (ii) 
absolute costs of signaling are often small; and (iii) very few papers have measured the 
difference in marginal costs that is central to all handicap models. These critics 
unanimously stress the need for new approaches that rigorously make the connection 
between costs and honesty.  
Most reviewers agree, though, that there are several examples that come close to 
demonstrating the hypothesized effects of cost – such as that of barn swallow tail length 
(discussed in Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 2011; Searcy & Nowicki, 2005). Research shows 
that experimental tail elongations alter survival rates differently for individuals of 
different quality (inferred from original tail length) (Møller & de Lope, 1994) – which is 
consistent with the differential marginal costs that handicap models require. Additional 
evidence demonstrates that elongated tails are costly and that male tail length is related to 
aspects of male quality (e.g., Møller, 1989, 1994; Møller, de Lope, & Caballero, 1995; 
Saino & Møller, 1996). Overall, this system provides a substantial body of evidence 
showing the ways in which this signaling system is consistent with honesty stabilized by 
cost. However, not all are convinced (e.g., Saunders, 2009), and the evidence falls short 
of an experimental demonstration that increased costs promote honesty. Our study stands 
out because we directly control the level of signal cost in our experimental system and it 
allows clear operational definitions of what constitutes honest and dishonest signals. The 
approach allows us to address the concerns of some critics and measure honesty at 
different levels of signal cost. 
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Limitations and further questions 
Does the handicap model apply outside of mate choice? The handicap principle 
leads two lives. For some investigators, it is ‘the handicap model of sexual selection’ 
(Hedrick, 2005; Matyjasiak et al., 1999; e.g., McGraw et al., 2005). This seems natural to 
some because Zahavi (A. Zahavi, 1975) originally proposed it in this context, because 
within the field of animal behavior it is most commonly discussed in this context, and 
most models of handicap signaling (such as Grafen 1990 and Getty 2006) develop this 
example. For others, it is a more general claim about the forces that stabilize honesty. For 
example, both Grafen (1990) and Zahavi (1977) took pains to point out the applicability 
of their ideas to problems beyond mate selection. Clearly, neither Grafen nor Zahavi felt 
that handicap signaling was limited to sexual advertisement. Similarly, students of 
handicap signaling have focused on signals that reveal information about the signaler—
male quality, ability to escape, or hunger (Caro, 1995; Kilner & Johnstone, 1997; Rivero, 
Alatalo, Kotiaho, Mappes, & Parri, 2000). Again this is more important historically than 
conceptually. The claim that a low-quality signaler pays a larger ‘marginal cost’ to signal 
helps make the idea of marginal cost more intuitive. As we remarked in the introduction, 
it is straightforward to show that the conditions required for honesty in our simple 
experimental game are algebraically identical to a discrete version of Grafen’s cost 
condition, which is widely regarded as the authoritative mathematical statement of the 
handicap principle. The algebra of the handicap principle does not depend on the example 
of mate choice signaling or the idea that signals necessarily indicate signaler quality. In 
general, the hypothesis holds that a dishonest strategist must pay larger marginal costs, 
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but the dishonest individual does not have to be lying about its own abilities, reproductive 
or otherwise. Moreover, the idea that models and tests of handicap signaling ought to be 
restricted to special situations seems counter-productive. Surely, behavioral ecologists 
want to study broadly applicable models, such as the general determinants of honesty, 
that have relevance to questions in the behavioral sciences that go far beyond mate 
choice.  
Learning? Traditional studies of signaling often emphasize genetically determined 
traits—like tail length—in natural or semi-natural situations. Readers from this tradition 
may be uncomfortable with studies of signaling equilibria that depend on relatively 
arbitrary learned behavior. While this sentiment is understandable, there are several 
reasons to think that this novel approach can provide useful insights. First, the game 
theoretical equilibria predicted by models of handicap signaling do not depend on the 
mechanism underlying their stability: Thorndike’s law of effect or natural selection 
against a ‘cheater gene’ are equally admissible theoretically. Moreover, learning is a 
well-documented and well-understood biological mechanism (Domjan, 1998; Kandel, 
2000; Thorndike, 1911), and this is surely why Maynard Smith devoted considerable 
theoretical attention to the role of learning in behavioral equilibrium (1982, chapter 5); 
reminding us that both ‘learning and genetic change may in involved’ (p. 77) in the 
establishment of behavioral equilibria (and see Fawcett, Hamblin, & Giraldeau, 2013; 
Giraldeau & Dubois, 2008; Morand-Ferron & Giraldeau, 2010). Second, as the quotation 
of Maynard Smith suggests, it is simply incorrect to think of learning and natural 
selection as incompatible opponents. Learning, like hormones and sensory receptors, is 
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an evolved feature of animals (see Dunlap & Stephens, 2009). Moreover learning is 
clearly an important mechanism in animal social interactions including signaling. Finally, 
several recent reviews (Kilner & Johnstone, 1997; Kotiaho, 2001; Searcy & Nowicki, 
2005; Számadó, 2011) have emphasized the difficulties faced by traditional approaches 
and called for fresh approaches to the study of signals and signal costs. Our studies will 
provide one new line of evidence that represents such a fresh approach. Our ultimate 
contribution will depend on how this new line of evidence interacts with and informs 
more traditional studies.  
Final summary 
Our results represent the first experimental test of the causal relationship between 
signal costs and honesty. While recent criticisms have characterized the efforts to connect 
cost and honesty as misguided or incomplete, our results suggest a position that lies 
somewhere between the critics and the supporters of the ‘signals as costly handicaps’ 
research program. The experimental signaling game defines signal costs and other game 
parameters, and allows this research to begin addressing the concerns raised by ‘signal 
cost’ detractors. Our results support the role of costs in some situations, but they also 
place the onus on students of signal costs to clearly demonstrate that signaler’s and 
receiver’s incentives are indeed opposed. That is, the costliness of signals itself does not 
imply the role of signal cost in honesty; mutualisms or other mechanisms can also drive 
honesty. However, as we demonstrate, costs do enforce honesty in some cases. While 
studies of animal signals probe ever deeper into the physiological and genetic 
mechanisms that make signals costly or condition dependent, these studies seem 
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increasingly distant from the problem of honesty. Our approach represents an effort to re-
connect these studies with the question that motivated them: how and when do costs 
affect signal reliability? 
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Table 3.1: Payoff matrices for 
our experimental game
4
.  
A. Receiver’s payoffs: the 
receiver always does best by 
matching its behavior to the 
state of the environment. The 
receiver obtains 1 unit of food 
(3 pellets in the experiment) if it chooses the accept action in the true state, or choosing 
the reject action in the false state; otherwise it obtains nothing. B. Signaler’s payoffs: if 
the state is true, the signaler obtains 1 unit of food (3 pellets) when the receiver chooses 
accept. If the state is false however, the variables a and b determine whether the 
signaler’s incentives are aligned with the receiver’s. When a > b, the signaler does best 
when the receiver ‘accepts’ regardless of which state applies. When a > b, therefore, the 
signaler and receiver incentives are opposed when the state is false. In the reverse 
situation, when b > a, the signaler and receiver incentives are always aligned.  In our 
incentives aligned condition a=0.33 and b=1.0, while in our incentives opposed a=1.0 
and b=0.33. C. Signaling costs: If the signaler chooses to signal, it must pay a cost (c) 
determined by the current treatment (where c = 0, 1, 4, or 7 perch hops). Models
 
predict 
stable honest signaling when (a-b) < c. In order to make correct comparisons, we assume 
that the parameters a, b, and c are normalized to the value of a single unit of food.  
  
                                                 
4
 Chapter 3 tables and figures from Polnaszek & Stephens (2014), reproduced with permission. 
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  Signaler 
  Honest Dishonest 
R
ec
ei
v
er
 
F
o
ll
o
w
 
 A+b(1-p)  A+(1-p)(a-c) 
1  p  
Ig
n
o
re
  A+a(1-p)  A+(1-p)(a-c) 
p  p  
 
Table 3.2: Game matrix based on the model we outlined. Here we assume (p>0.5), and 
set A=p(1-c). The strategies Honest/Follow are stable under two conditions. 1) When 
b>a, this is when signaler and receiver incentives are aligned. 2) When c > (a-b), which 
means the cost of signaling is greater than the benefit gained from deceiving the receiver.
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Figure 3.1: Apparatus. Blue jays occupied side-
by-side skinner boxes with one jay assigned to the 
role of signaler and another assigned to the role of 
receiver. Each box was fitted with two perch 
stations, which could record subject’s presence or 
absence. The signaler and receiver used these 
perches to play a signaling game in a sequence of 
trials during the course of the day. At the 
beginning of each trial, a computer determined the 
‘state of environment’ to be true or false (see 
Table 1). The state in a given trial was unknown 
to the receiver but revealed privately to the 
signaler via a system of cue lights. Signalers 
provided positional signals to the receiver by choosing either the ‘signal’ or ‘no signal’ 
perch station. In response, the receiver must choose between one of two stations at the 
front of its chamber. If the state was true, the receiver could only obtain food by hopping 
onto the ‘accept’ perch; and if the state was false the receiver could only obtain food by 
hopping onto the ‘reject’ perch (Table 1A). Table 1B shows how the receiver’s action 
determined the payoffs received by the signaler. To implement signal costs, the signaler 
was required to hop back and forth between the cost and rear stations c times (Table 1C). 
The signaler was always free to choose the ‘no signal’ station without cost. 
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Figure 3.2: The observed level of honest signaling (A) and signal following (B) for each 
of 8 different treatments. Box plots summarize the results for each treatment (medians 
plus or minus upper and lower quartiles), and accompanying curves show the best fitting 
logistic regressions. A. The y-axis shows the relative frequency with which the signaler 
honestly chose the “no signal” action when “reject” was the receiver’s best option. B. 
Identical to panel A except that the y-axis shows the relative frequency with which the 
receiver followed the signaler’s action (e.g., “accept” if “signal”; note, the y-axis scale 
differs from A). For both panels the x-axis shows the four levels of signal cost (c= 0, 1, 4 
or 7), measured in ‘shuttle flights’. The light-gray boxes and accompanying dashed curve 
show our incentives opposed treatments. The black boxes and accompanying solid curve 
show our incentives aligned treatments. 
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Chapter 4: Why are signals reliable? Costs enforce honesty, 
sometimes.5 
 
Introduction 
The cost-enforced signaling experiment described in Chapter 3 (Polnaszek & 
Stephens, 2014) is the target of recent criticism (Számadó & Penn, 2015). Szamado and 
Penn’s article raises several important conceptual misconceptions within the literature 
regarding handicaps and costly signaling, and here we address the issues raised in the 
critique. Our experiments provide direct experimental evidence that signal costs can 
stabilize honest signaling, a central claim of handicap literature. Szamado and Penn agree 
that we have demonstrated the effect of signal cost on honesty, but dispute the relevance 
of this result to handicap signaling. The handicap signaling literature is a veritable sea of 
claims and counter-claims. Some of these claims are plausible and well supported while 
others are simply wild assertions. Our experiment does not test all of these claims, and it 
was not intended to do so. Yet at several points Szamado and Penn’s critique seems to 
focus on the more extreme assertions of the handicap literature, even though our study 
does not address or claim to address them. Therefore, this chapter aims to both reinforce 
our views on several key themes in costly signaling literature, as well as help resolve 
confusion over important topics and terminology. 
 
                                                 
5
 This chapter is adapted from: Polnaszek, T. J. & Stephens, D.W. (2015) Why are signals reliable? Costs 
enforce honesty, sometimes. Animal Behaviour, in press. 
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Costs are not always necessary for honesty 
We agree with the emerging consensus in the literature that costs are not 
universally necessary to stabilize signaling. Our manuscript does not support the idea that 
all honest communication involves costly signals nor do we imply complete confirmation 
of the handicap principle as proposed by Zahavi and Zahavi (1999). Many models of 
signaling, like our template model (the Sir Philip Sidney game – Maynard Smith, 1991) 
conflict with the idea that honesty can only exist in the presence of handicapping signal 
costs. The clearest example is mutualism: if there is no incentive to cheat, costs are 
unnecessary. Our results support this limitation because we found that signal costs did not 
affect honesty in the mutualism treatments. 
The cost of cheating enforces honesty 
From a game theoretical perspective, it is the cost of dishonesty, not the signal 
costs paid by honest ‘high quality’ individuals, that enforces honesty (here ‘high quality’ 
relates to the ‘true’ condition in our experiment). That is, honest ‘high quality’ 
individuals could pay low or no costs, the crucial questions are what does it cost to signal 
dishonestly and what can dishonest individuals can gain? Theoretical models, in 
particular those framed as action-response games (e.g., Hurd, 1995), highlight this 
important distinction. We agree that it is the cost of dishonesty that stabilizes honest 
signaling, as demonstrated by our ‘signal costs’ model in Chapter 1. Although we 
recognize the important distinction between the types of costs and their predicted effects 
on honesty, our experiment did not test this hypothesis. As a first experiment using our 
experimental signaling games we chose to test a simpler situation in which the costs paid 
   99 
by honest and dishonest signalers were systematically related. Testing this subtler 
hypothesis would be a natural next step in this experimental program. Which is to say, we 
agree with Szamado and Penn that different assumptions regarding the cost structure 
could, in theory, stabilize honest signaling without a high cost for honest signalers.  
While theory continues to reiterate the point that signal costs do not imply cost 
enforced honesty (or handicaps), this idea is difficult to navigate in practice. As our 
model in Chapter 1 points out, the observed costs of honesty at equilibrium do not matter 
(and see Számadó, 1999). Thus, demonstrating the costs of signaling mate quality (e.g., 
Møller & de Lope, 1994), hunger levels (e.g., Moreno-Rueda, Redondo, Trenzado, Sanz, 
& Zúñiga, 2012), etc. does not necessarily help us resolve the question ‘what makes 
signals reliable?’. All readers may not agree with our experimental approach in Chapter 3 
(e.g., Számadó & Penn, 2015), but most agree that new perspectives and novel 
approaches are necessary to move forward in the study of ‘costly signaling’ (Kotiaho, 
2001; Moreno-Rueda, 2007). 
Continuous vs. discrete signaling games 
We realize that the terminology appropriate for discrete models (like our 
experimental game) differs somewhat from the terminology of continuous models that 
represent the traditional approach to handicap signaling. These terminological differences 
are clearly a source of some confusion and disagreement in costly signaling literature 
(e.g., between Polnaszek & Stephens, 2015; Számadó & Penn, 2015). We remark, 
however, that while mathematicians recognize some important differences between 
continuous and a discrete systems (e.g. discrete can become chaotic at lower dimensions 
   100 
than continuous systems) none of these issues are relevant here. The translation from the 
continuous to discrete case here is straightforward and even pedestrian. 
State-dependent differences in marginal costs 
A key claim of many handicap models is that the marginal costs of dishonesty 
must vary between states (e.g., between the True and False states in our game, see Table 
1). This is often given in the form: ‘low quality signalers must pay greater marginal costs 
for dishonesty’. Szamado & Penn deliver what is apparently a crushing critique of our 
experiment on this score when they say: “The costs imposed on the signallers were the 
same in the two different conditions, and thus, by definition there cannot be any 
difference in the marginal costs.” The reader can easily see Szamado and Penn’s point by 
considering the ‘cost table’ from our paper (Table 1). The cost structure in the True and 
False states is the same, and so it would seem that the marginal costs (c-0) are the same. 
This analysis is subtly, but importantly incorrect, because we are interested in the 
marginal costs of dishonesty, not the marginal costs of two arbitrary signalling actions. 
An honest signaller, of course, indicates True when the state is True, and False when the 
state is False.  However, a dishonest signaller always indicates True regardless of state 
(as clearly stated in our paper); notice that the dishonest signaller does not just signal the 
opposite of the actual state, because this would mean that it acts against its own best 
interests in the True state. With this in mind, it’s easy to re-write the Table 1 in terms of 
honesty and dishonesty (Table 2). Clearly, the marginal cost of dishonesty in the True 
state is zero—because honest and dishonest strategists behave in the same self-interested 
way in the True state, while the marginal cost of dishonesty in the False state is c, which 
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is clearly greater than zero. It is, therefore, somewhat simplistic to assert that there cannot 
be a state-dependent difference in marginal costs in our experiment. In connection with 
this point, Szamado & Penn rely heavily on Hurd’s analysis of a two-by-two signalling 
game (1995) that is somewhat more general than the two-by-two signalling game that we 
studied experimentally. They claim that these so-called action-response games imply a 
marginal cost condition that is qualitatively different from the condition proposed by 
Grafen (1990). This appears to be at variance with Hurd’s own analysis of the action-
response game. Hurd concludes that support for Grafen’s differential marginal cost claim 
‘follows directly’ from his analysis (p. 219). 
The (non)-importance of efficacy costs and strategic costs 
The intended utility of these two terms is to isolate situations where reliability 
depends on cost (strategic costs) from those where costs are important in transmitting 
signals but unrelated to honesty (efficacy costs) (Maynard Smith and Harper, 1995). Thus 
it seems our costs may fit the spirit of the ‘strategic’ definition because reliability 
depended on cost in some experimental treatments. Yet we feel this label is ultimately 
unimportant, especially because it tends to conflate the important issues at hand. Our 
experimental signaling system allows us to directly test whether costs are necessary for 
honesty, negating the utility of separating types of cost.  
After chastising us for failing to distinguish between efficacy and strategic costs, 
Szamado & Penn conclude with the observation that the distinction is misleading and 
impossible to study in practice. We agree that, in practice, separating efficacy and 
strategic costs is a futile exercise; especially because observed costs in signaling systems 
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may simultaneously fulfill both definitions from above! So while we understand that this 
distinction is important to some students of costly signaling (e.g. Maynard Smith & 
Harper 1995), our paper makes no claim to have demonstrated any such distinction. 
Moreover, the model that motivated our experiment does not depend on this distinction. 
Investigators who wish to pursue the distinction more directly will have to design a 
different experiment, yet the central result of our paper – that experimentally manipulated 
signal costs stabilize honesty – seems like a good starting point to us. 
Signal costs, handicaps and indices 
Szamado and Penn assert that the effect of costs on honesty shown in our study 
cannot be an instance of handicap signaling because our experiment created an instance 
of ‘index signaling.’ The idea is that some signals are so tightly correlated with the states 
they indicate that they are uncheatable, and therefore no further reliability-maintaining 
mechanisms are required. We cannot agree that our experimental signals served as 
indices. We can be sure, however, that they were not ‘uncheatable,’ because our subjects 
did, in fact, cheat. Subjects sometimes signaled dishonestly in all our treatment 
conditions, although the relative frequency of this cheating depended on signal cost. 
Surely, a defining property of index signaling is that it should not depend on signal cost. 
The central idea of indices is an inescapable correlation between state (‘True’ or ‘False’ 
in our experiment) and signal. The key factor that invalidates the premise of our 
experimental signals being indices is that in our experiment the correlation between state 
and signal was entirely under the signaller’s control. The jays could freely choose 
whether to signal or not, and indeed our signallers varied the properties of the state-signal 
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correlation in an orderly and systematic way with experimentally manipulated cost and 
payoff parameters. The correlation that Szamado and Penn seem to be complaining about 
is the correlation between cost and emitted signal, which we did control experimentally. 
It may be more costly to produce a larger tail (a cost-to-signal correlation), but this is 
only an index if, for example, you are advertising tail length (causing a strict state-to-
signal correlation). This does not correspond to the situation modeled in our experiment.  
Unobservable costs 
Szamado and Penn point out that some versions of the handicap hypothesis 
require that the receiver perceive the costliness of signals. Our experiment did not explore 
this claim because the cost-imposing ‘shuttle flights’ took place out of the receiver’s 
sight. We suspect that making the costs visible to receivers would not change our result, 
although they only way to know for sure is to conduct the experiment. One could easily 
design an experiment where signal costs are visible to the receiver, but even then we 
cannot know what the receiver or the signaler ‘know’ about the signal costs. Thus, 
centering a model on the idea that receivers must have some direct knowledge or 
perception of the costs paid seems untenable. We remark however that a program of 
research that focuses on the perceptions and cognitive representations of signalers and 
receivers-while potentially fascinating—is fraught with all the practical and philosophical 
difficulties that characterize the study of non-human cognition. We certainly do not claim 
to have solved the significant problems such a research program presents.  
Moreover, if a signal is kept honest by costs, then it must be ‘perceptibly costly’ 
in some sense. Let us imagine a system where tail color is a signal of male quality, where 
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high quality males have long tails and low quality males have short tails. Additionally, 
tail length is costly, such that it does not pay to use the signal dishonestly. If females 
choose based on tail length they must differentiate between tail lengths. Thus producing a 
long tail (or any signal linked to cost) is ‘perceptibly costly’ by definition because it has 
higher costs and is perceptibly different from a short tail. Females do not need to perceive 
or assess costs, but rather the fruits of those costs (the signals), which in turn may or may 
not be linked to cost 
Conclusion – What’s in a name? 
Clearly, conflict over terms and historical baggage related to the handicap 
principle contributed to the disagreement outlined in these two papers. There are many 
conflicting  definitions of handicap signaling (e.g., Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 2011; 
Emlen, Warren, Johns, Dworkin, & Lavine, 2012; Hurd & Enquist, 2005; Husak, 
Henningsen, Vanhooydonck, & Irschick, 2015; Mautz, Møller, & Jennions, 2013; 
Maynard Smith & Harper, 2003; Ougham, Thomas, & Archetti, 2008; Roulin, 2015; 
Ruxton & Schaefer, 2011; Ryan & Wilczynski, 2011; Számadó, 2011), and even 
recommendations to completely retire the term (Getty, 2006). Nevertheless, the term 
remains firmly entrenched in the literature and we attempted to frame our experiments 
using this common language from animal signaling. 
 In the end, exploring the conditions where costs stabilize honesty is more important 
than the naming of these costs. Our primary goal was to reconnect the costly signaling 
literature with the questions that motivated the field – why are signals reliable? A clear 
starting point is to establish a direct causal relationship between signal costs and honesty; 
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a claim central to costly signaling theory (including the handicap hypothesis). Szamado 
and Penn agree that our experiment demonstrates that costs stabilize honesty, specifically 
in conditions of conflict. “If agreement exists on the mechanisms that underlie the 
enforcement of signal reliability, not too much importance should be given to how the 
signal is labeled” (Searcy & Nowicki, 2005 pg. 217). 
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  State 
  True False 
Signal emitted 
Signal (Indicate 
True) 
c c 
No-Signal (Indicate 
False) 
0 0 
 
Table 4.1: The costs of the signaling actions ‘signal’ vs. ‘No-signal’ did not differ 
between the True and False state in our experiment (from Polnaszek & Stephens, 
2014). 
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  State 
  True False 
Strategy 
Honest c 0 
Dishonest c c 
 
Table 4.2: This table also shows the cost structure from Polnaszek and Stephens 
(2014), but illustrates the costs for each strategy (Honest vs. Dishonest). The new 
visualization of the costs of signaling makes the difference in cost more readily 
apparent; a dishonest strategist pays a higher cost in the False state. 
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